While the discussion on foundationalism has been alive and well for years now, especially in regard to postmodernism, it seems that Paul Helm’s review of Franke’s book The Character of Theology has sparked renewed discussion on that subject among Reformed bloggers. It is here that I wish to submit my two cents.

Thesis
It is the thesis of this article that one can very well reject postmodern anti-foundationalism along with its illegitimate postevangelical stepchild without committing oneself to foundationalism – whether strong (i.e., “classical”), moderate, or otherwise. In fact, it is my contention that a truly Reformed epistemology (no pun intended) must not be foundationalist at all. Therefore, I will assert that we have strong personal and (more importantly) strong biblical precedent & reason to reject both Scylla and Charybdis – both foundationalism and non-/post-/anti-foundationalism.

Before we can reject foundationalism, it might be a good idea to define it first.¹ This is really of utmost importance in the debate due to the curious fact that some people have classified certain theologians as foundationalists while others have classified them as non-foundationalists (for the same reasons no less). In fact, after reading my article, some people might well think of me as a foundationalist. The real question one must ask, however, are: According to which definition and would I consider myself a foundationalist? So for clarity and fairness’ sake, let’s begin by getting our definitional ducks in a row.

Some Definitions
Several definitions have come up in the recent discussion, none more inspired than the other. But we can classify them in two categories: broad definitions and narrow definitions.

(a) broad definitions:
Paul Helm seems to be an example of someone working from a broad definition of foundationalism since he juxtaposes foundationalism with relativism & skepticism and he presents one or the other as the only viable options. He also refers to “ultimate criteria” in one’s epistemology which, (for him) look like “foundations.” Thus, foundationalism is a theory of justification of one’s belief vis-à-vis skepticism and relativism that builds upon ultimate criteria or any kind of foundational belief.

Another broad definition is the following:

“Foundationalism is the view that knowledge is possible only if some items serve as a certain foundation for the rest. Special attention is drawn to the alleged certainty of the proposed foundations and to the relation between the foundations and the rest of knowledge.”²

Here as well, knowledge is justified by certain (pun intended) “items,” (i.e. basic beliefs) that serve as a foundation for other non-basic beliefs. It seems that just about any item or belief will suffice.

(b) narrow definitions:
A narrow definition (not absolutely, but by degree) for foundationalism can be found in the following:

“Foundationalism is a view about the structure of justification or knowledge. The foundationalist thesis in short is that all knowledge and justified belief rest ultimately on a foundation of non-inferential knowledge or justified belief.”³

I refer to this definition as more narrow because it defines the “foundation” more tightly as “non-inferential.” Here, not just any old belief will do. Within this narrow understanding of foundationalism, foundational knowledge (or justified belief) is sometimes also called “direct knowledge,” or “immediate knowledge,” or “intuitive knowledge.” The truths (i.e. justified beliefs) thus known are self-evident or “given.” According to these narrow foundationalists, a belief is epistemically justified if and only if (1) it is founded upon or derived from a basic, non-inferential belief or beliefs and/or (2) it is justified by a coherent chain of beliefs that is supported by basic beliefs on which all non-basic beliefs must be founded.

Given the preceding definitions, we find essential agreement in the following: (1) basic beliefs do not require justification because they are properly basic and therefore underived. It is both impossible and unnecessary to go beyond these properly basic beliefs, otherwise an infinite regress would follow; (2) knowledge is a specific, “higher” form of belief in that it is justified, true belief. Knowledge cannot consist of justified but false belief, neither can it be true but unjustified belief. The beliefs constituting knowledge need to be both properly basic and justified.

So far, we have distinguished between narrow and broad definitions of foundationalism. These definitions make a distinction with regard to degree only. In any thoughtful discussion on foundationalism, a clear distinction must also be made between what may be termed “classical foundationalism” and “moderate foundationalism.”⁴ This distinction cuts across the narrow/wide foundationalist taxonomy. At base, the difference between classical and moderate foundationalism has to do with the definition and character of basic beliefs. What are they? What counts for properly basic? Is it internal to the knower or external?

Classical foundationalism is that theory of knowledge that defines knowledge as founded on indubitable, innate beliefs. Therefore, it claims the possibility (and usually actuality) of an infallibly correct sequence that begins with basic beliefs and moves to true knowledge. This form of foundationalism was part and parcel of the modernistic project of Descartes and beyond. But even Greek philosophy was to a great extent foundationalist. This form of foundationalism, it needs to be said, is all but dead today. If this is what the postmodern critics target, they have targeted a beautiful straw man.

More moderate foundationalism (which is what contemporary foundationalists usually affirm) rejects innate ideas and the claim to infallibility. Recognizing our human finiteness (and even sinfulness), it abandons the triumphalist language of Cartesian foundationalism with regard to infallible certainty. We can easily see why this version would be attractive to many Christian theologians and philosophers. It steers a comfortable middle course between the fallibilism/infallibilism dilemma. In its Christian form, it claims both infallibility (in the mind of God and his infallible revelation) as well as fallibility (namely with respect to man and his power of reasoning and knowing). In this scheme, the epistemic regress problem is avoided by an appeal to God’s authority and knowledge. It really is a humble attempt. Nevertheless, it still affirms that particular beliefs are more basic than others, even absolutely basic, so that they can serve (even if fallibly) as a foundation to non-basic, derived beliefs - which ultimately makes true knowledge possible.

Critique of “Christian” Foundationalism
After providing some definitions and distinguishing between narrow and broad definitions, as well as between classical (infallibilist) and moderate (fallibilist) foundationalism⁵ we are now in the position to provide a critique.
In my critique I want to focus on the claim that in rejecting postmodern non-foundationalism (along with its remote cousins skepticism and relativism), a Christian must opt for some form of (moderate) foundationalism or theory of proper basicality of beliefs as a theory of epistemic justification.

I do not know why and when exactly it happened, but at some point in the past decade or two it seems that it suddenly became an unspoken assumption that to be an orthodox (even Reformed) epistemologically self-conscious Christian one had to be a foundationalist. Paul Helm seems to be of the opinion that whoever dismisses foundationalism, dismisses truth altogether - truth at least in the sense of the correspondence theory.⁶ That, however, is a logical non sequitur. While we must remember that Helm is a proponent of a broader definition of foundationalism, that claim is outrageous nonetheless. While I do happen to agree on the whole with Helm’s assessment and critique of postmodern/postevangelical theology,⁷ I do believe that this non sequitur or false dilemma between foundationalism and skepticism/relativism seriously weakens his case and I wish he would abandon it altogether in his critique of postevangelical theology. Millard Erickson in his book Truth or Consequences - The Promise and Perils of Postmodernism is another theologian who creates the same false dilemma: Either (moderate) foundationalism or postmodern skepticism/relativism.⁸ Foundationalism, a highly specific theory of epistemic justification seems to have (somehow) become canonically bound up with Christianity proper. Now, to be sure, I do believe that the Bible presents us with a particular epistemology, just as it presents us with a particular metaphysic. We are, fortunately, not left to choose according to taste here. But why foundationalism? Is that all we have in our Christian repertoire? Could it be that we have been a bit short sighted here?

We can well agree with the following critique of Helm’s foundationalism:

“He and others seem to think that if foundationalism goes, truth goes. If that were the case, one could see why he and others are worried: Truth matters to Christianity–and it matters in as many senses as the concept truth has. But it should be more than obvious now that getting rid of foundationalism doesn’t have anything to do with abandoning a robust commitment to the concept of truth. We’ve seen above that getting rid of foundationalism in no way limits us from talking about what is right or wrong, true or false about beliefs or the world. Indeed, the epistemology I implicitly endorsed honors truth far, far better than does foundationalism. Foundationalism confuses truth with justification. The form of epistemology that I implicitly sketched honors the difference between justification and truth, the gap between what we believe is true and what actually is true. I think this is precisely the distinction folks like Helm want to keep. Ironically, foundationalism does more to undermine that distinction than to support it.”

If we are clear on our definitions (see above), we should not fall prey to false dilemmas such as, “either foundationalism or skepticism,” or “abandon foundationalism, abandon right and wrong,” etc.

A Possible Way Out
Having now provided a critique of the “Christian foundationalism thesis,” I want to provide some initial reflections on a tertium quid. I have struggled with what name to give this other option, but I am apparently not creative and trendy enough to come up with anything. So I am giving it the totally unspectacular name: Reformed epistemology. By this move, of course, I do not want to identify myself with the “Reformed epistemology” of Alvin Plantinga, Kelly James Clark, Nicholas Wolterstorff, et al. I have often wondered how and why they have been awarded this name for so long and I do hope they will give it back to whom it belongs eventually (if they haven’t already) because I do not consider their approach very Reformed in a confessional sense at all (and they might even grant me that point for all I know). And, after all, a Reformed epistemology certainly is not a registered trademark, so am I not allowed to have one too?

Instead of a “Christian” fallibilist or biblical infallibilist/fallibilist foundationalism in which the foundation of the word of God is infallible while our knowledge even of infallible truth always remains fallible, I want to suggest a thoroughly and historically Reformed/Calvinist/Van Tilian approach to the question of epistemic justification.

Let us begin, in historical order, with Calvin. Building upon the inspired truth of Romans 1:19-21, we can say with Calvin that there is in man an ineradicable sensus divinitatis. How did it get there? By creation. It is therefore a constitutional or (to speak philosophically) a metaphysical phenomenon. That much seems to be common ground (pun intended) among all Reformed.⁹ But Romans 1 is even more specific than is often seen. It does not merely speak of God’s knowability (Ï„o γνωστoν τοu θεοu; v.19), however construed, it talks about actual knowledge (γνoντες Ï„oν θεoν; v.21). They (i.e. unbelievers) actually know God! That statement is simultaneously simple and profound. This knowledge of God is not the end of a chain of inferential reasoning, but rather a non-discursive knowledge. We could even call it “properly basic” were it not for the possible misunderstandings that would likely arise. To be sure, this knowledge is non-saving in its content and quality, but given Paul’s argument about the utter futility and foolishness of human thinking (and on the basis of this transcendental God knowledge - cf. vv.21; 22; 28) it is the most basic starting point of the epistemic sequence.

And in this very concrete human knowledge of God lies the repudiation of all foundationalist schemes. In foundationalism of all stripes there are basic beliefs and non-basic beliefs. Given a certain valid and justified transaction between the one to the other and the condition that the belief be true, belief at last evolves into knowledge. Knowledge, as we have said, is justified, true belief.

But here we must jump in and ask: biblically speaking, isn’t it the other way round? Don’t we have to say following Romans 1 and following Calvin’s understanding of the sensus divinitatis as actual, ineradicable, true knowledge that this certain knowledge is foundational and transcendentally “grounds” all belief? If that is the case, have we not turned foundationalism upside down and inside out? No longer does knowledge presuppose certain basic non-discursive beliefs, but belief presupposes certain, basic and true knowledge of God. We could even say “innate” knowledge of God if it weren’t for a possible (Cartesian) misunderstanding.

And this line of reasoning is nothing but the old transcendental argument that Van Til employed in his apologetics. An important feature of the transcendental argument is that it is, according to Van Til, “an absolutely certain argument.” It inquires into the conditions of possibility of human knowledge. Once these are established, it is absolutely sound and absolutely certain (and to argue for this is the subject for another paper). Here, it will be enough if we are able to see that this feature of absolute certainty (residing in the argument) distinguishes this transcendental theory of epistemic justification from moderate or modest foundationalism. Moderate foundationalism is unable to provide more than probability because it does not argue for infallibility on the level of basic beliefs - otherwise it would be strong (“classical”) foundationalism. But how is that probability established? By reference to other basic beliefs? But wouldn’t they need to be more basic still in order to render other basic beliefs probable? We see the dilemma of the infinite regress rear its ugly head once again with moderate foundationalism.

What, then, becomes the foundation of knowledge and of belief in a Reformed and biblical epistemology? It is first of all the knowledge of God as it is archetypically and analytically found in God himself, but also ectypically revealed (1) to us, (2) in us, and (3) in nature (general revelation) and from which we learn only in the Bible (special revelation). This foundation is rooted metaphysically in the state of affairs that obtains, namely the absolute metaphysical distinction between Creator and creature, and it is played out in a corresponding epistemological distinction between the self-knowledge of God and man’s reflective, analogical knowledge of God (cf. the beginning of Book I of Calvin’s Institutes).

This theory of knowledge can, of course, no longer be called “foundationalism” (either classical or moderate) in any meaningful and legitimate sense, though it still recognizes foundational truths (such as the knowledge of God) as any thinking, Bible-believing Christian will do.

By way of conclusion, I say that Cornelius Van Til (probably one of the greatest thinkers on Reformed/biblical epistemology) was not a foundationalist in any shape or form, either strong or moderate. I also believe that many other Reformed theologians of the 20th century (e.g. Bavinck, not to speak of Reformed orthodox theologians), were not foundationalists either.¹⁰ Insofar as Reformed theologians have shared with the Reformed orthodox scholastics the primacy of the principia theologiae - God as the (metaphysical) principle of being (principium essendi), revelation as the (epistemological) principle of knowing (principium cognoscendi), as well as the archetypal/ectypal distinction in knowledge which is basic to all epistemology and ends the problem of epistemic regress once and for all, they will have also escaped the Scylla and Charybdis of “Christian” foundationalism and postmodern antifoundationalism.

1. This is a joke, of course, although it seems to be a piece of advice that is not always heeded both by critics and proponents of foundationalism.↩
2. Taken from Nicholas Bunnin’s and E. P. Tsui-James’s The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy – found here.↩
3. Taken from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy – found here.↩
4. For now, the reader will forgive me if I lump together the so-called “Reformed epistemology” of Alvin Plantinga et al. and the “Christian foundationalism” of Millard Erickson, Paul Helm et al. under the rubric of “moderate foundationalism.” Though I am aware there are substantial differences between them and Cartesian foundationalism, nevertheless they all argue for something less than classical, infallibilist foundationalism.↩
5. The latter being, again, subdivided into the “Reformed epistemology” camp (Plantinga et al.) and the “generic” Christian foundationalist camp (Erickson, Helm, etc.).↩
6. That is the gist of his argument in the review of Franke’s book The Character of Theology: “In dismissing foundationalism [Franke] seems (I put the point gently) to be the advocate of relativism, if not of scepticism.”↩
7. Cf. the review of Franke’s book by Helm↩
8. Chapters 12 and 13 of Millard Erickson, Truth or Consequences - The Promise and Perils of Postmodernism (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001).↩
9. The fact that Barth would not share this view but still considered himself to be Reformed reveals more about him than about this common denominator of Reformed theology.↩
10. Again, I know I am cutting short here and not providing the footnotes substantiating this claim. But perhaps a later post can fill in these gaps.↩