Comments on: Foundationalism & Antifoundationalism: The Scylla and Charybdis of Epistemology http://blog.solagratia.org/2005/11/17/foundationalism-antifoundationalism-the-scylla-and-charybdis-of-epistemology/ Dealing with issues in reformed theology. Wed, 07 Jan 2009 14:28:46 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.6 By: Reformata - A Reformed Blog » “A Triunity of Knowledge”: Foundationalism, Realism and the Correspondence Theory of Truth http://blog.solagratia.org/2005/11/17/foundationalism-antifoundationalism-the-scylla-and-charybdis-of-epistemology/#comment-33 Reformata - A Reformed Blog » “A Triunity of Knowledge”: Foundationalism, Realism and the Correspondence Theory of Truth Thu, 24 Nov 2005 23:04:30 +0000 http://blog.solagratia.org/?p=26#comment-33 [...] In summary, after having rejected the correspondence theory of truth both in internal and biblical grounds, we want to maintain a theory of truth that is not univocal but rather analogical, that does justice to the distinction between God’s being and reality and man’s being and reality, to the distinction between the divine archetypal knowledge and the human ectypal knowledge. This theory holds to (archetypal and exhaustive) coherence in the mind of God and (ectypal and partial) coherence in the mind of man insofar as the latter corresponds to the former by being informed by revelation. In this system we have successfully overcome the subject/object dilemma, overcome the need for univocal predication and therefore done justice to the most basic biblical distinctions. It is therefore a truly and peculiarly Christian and biblical theory of truth that can withstand both the onslaught of the postmodern critique and the charge of rationalism to which conventional theories are subject. Stanley J. Grenz, Renewing the Center: Evangelical Theology in a Post-Theological Era Baker Academic, 2000), 190. [back]By “evangelical,” I mean theologians critical of the postmodern/postconservative approach to theology. I realize that “postconservatives” consider themselves to be evangelicals also. But that is for another paper to explore. For now, I will stick with this oversimplified taxonomy. [back]Millard J. Erickson, Paul Kjoss Helseth, and Justin Taylor, eds., Reclaiming the Center: Confronting Evangelical Accommodation in Postmodern Times (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2004), 329. [back]Ibid., 330. [back]In this article I can only treat of the correspondence theory of truth. I have treated (“Christian”) foundationalism in an earlier post here. A post on (critical) realism might follow. [back] He speaks of “adventitious ideas” here and not “innate ideas.” [back]Again, mind my “definition” of evangelicals above. [back]J. P. Moreland and G. DeWeese, “The Premature Report of Foundationalism’s Demise” in Ibid.. Ibid., “What is Truth and Why Does it Matter?” Boundless Webzine. Online here. [back]Douglas Groothuis, Truth Decay: Defending Christianity Against the Challenges of Postmodernism (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity, 2000), 60-63. Cf. also ibid., “Truth Defined and Defended,” in Ibid., 59-80. Cf. also his article “What is Truth?” Online here. [back]James Emery White, What Is Truth?: A Comparative Study of the Positions of Cornelius Van Til, Francis Schaeffer, Carl F. H. Henry, Donald Bloesch, Millard Erickson Baptist Sunday School Board, 1994). [back]Millard J. Erickson, Truth or Consequences: The Promise & Perils of Postmodernism (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 234. [back]Moreland, “What is Truth and Why Does It Matter”. Online here. [back]Groothuis, “What is Truth?” Online here. [back]Millard J. Erickson, Paul Kjoss Helseth, and Justin Taylor, eds., Reclaiming the Center: Confronting Evangelical Accommodation in Postmodern Times (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2004), 328-29. [back]Ibid., 330. [back]Millard J. Erickson, Truth or Consequences: The Promise & Perils of Postmodernism (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 234. [back]Stan Wallace, “The Real Issue: Discerning and Defining the Essentials of Postmodernism.” Online here. [back]J. P. Moreland, “What is Truth and Why Does It Matter”. Online here. [back]Douglas Groothuis, “Truth Defined and Defended,” in Millard J. Erickson, Paul Kjoss Helseth, and Justin Taylor, eds., Reclaiming the Center: Confronting Evangelical Accommodation in Postmodern Times (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2004), 79. [back]Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (London: SCM Press, 1962), 257. The Latin term used in philosophy to express this idea of agreement was adaequatio. Thomas Aquinas replaced it with correspondentia from which we get the ‘correspondence theory of truth’. [back]Ibid., 262. [back]In The Essence of Truth Heidegger asks. “And what is the true? The true is what is known. It is just what corresponds with the facts. The proposition corresponds with what is known in knowledge; thus with what is true. The true? So does the correspondence of the proposition amount to correspondence with something corresponding? A fine definition! Truth is correspondence with a correspondence, the latter itself corresponds with a correspondence, and so forth. [...] What presents itself as self-evident is utterly obscure”(Martin Heidegger, The Essence Of Truth: On Plato's Cave Allegory and Theaetetus [n.p.: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2002], 2-3). [back]Heidegger reads Plato’s cave allegory as a story of unveiling, of bringing the hidden to unhiddenness (α-ληθεια). Correspondence does not even play a role there at all. [back]Ibid., 259. [back]And along with it the separation (and later, correspondance) between the real and the ideal. [back]K. Scott Oliphint’s review of Millard J. Erickson, Paul Kjoss Helseth, and Justin Taylor, eds., Reclaiming the Center: Confronting Evangelical Accommodation in Postmodern Times (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2004). Online here. [back]Cornelius Van Til, A Survey of Christian Epistemology (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1980), 1-2. [back]Ibid., 2-3. [back]Ibid., 3-4. [back] Nailed to the door of the castle church on November 23rd, 2005 Filed under: Apologetics | | trackback [...] [...] In summary, after having rejected the correspondence theory of truth both in internal and biblical grounds, we want to maintain a theory of truth that is not univocal but rather analogical, that does justice to the distinction between God’s being and reality and man’s being and reality, to the distinction between the divine archetypal knowledge and the human ectypal knowledge. This theory holds to (archetypal and exhaustive) coherence in the mind of God and (ectypal and partial) coherence in the mind of man insofar as the latter corresponds to the former by being informed by revelation. In this system we have successfully overcome the subject/object dilemma, overcome the need for univocal predication and therefore done justice to the most basic biblical distinctions. It is therefore a truly and peculiarly Christian and biblical theory of truth that can withstand both the onslaught of the postmodern critique and the charge of rationalism to which conventional theories are subject. Stanley J. Grenz, Renewing the Center: Evangelical Theology in a Post-Theological Era Baker Academic, 2000), 190. [back]By “evangelical,” I mean theologians critical of the postmodern/postconservative approach to theology. I realize that “postconservatives” consider themselves to be evangelicals also. But that is for another paper to explore. For now, I will stick with this oversimplified taxonomy. [back]Millard J. Erickson, Paul Kjoss Helseth, and Justin Taylor, eds., Reclaiming the Center: Confronting Evangelical Accommodation in Postmodern Times (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2004), 329. [back]Ibid., 330. [back]In this article I can only treat of the correspondence theory of truth. I have treated (“Christian”) foundationalism in an earlier post here. A post on (critical) realism might follow. [back] He speaks of “adventitious ideas” here and not “innate ideas.” [back]Again, mind my “definition” of evangelicals above. [back]J. P. Moreland and G. DeWeese, “The Premature Report of Foundationalism’s Demise” in Ibid.. Ibid., “What is Truth and Why Does it Matter?” Boundless Webzine. Online here. [back]Douglas Groothuis, Truth Decay: Defending Christianity Against the Challenges of Postmodernism (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity, 2000), 60-63. Cf. also ibid., “Truth Defined and Defended,” in Ibid., 59-80. Cf. also his article “What is Truth?” Online here. [back]James Emery White, What Is Truth?: A Comparative Study of the Positions of Cornelius Van Til, Francis Schaeffer, Carl F. H. Henry, Donald Bloesch, Millard Erickson Baptist Sunday School Board, 1994). [back]Millard J. Erickson, Truth or Consequences: The Promise & Perils of Postmodernism (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 234. [back]Moreland, “What is Truth and Why Does It Matter”. Online here. [back]Groothuis, “What is Truth?” Online here. [back]Millard J. Erickson, Paul Kjoss Helseth, and Justin Taylor, eds., Reclaiming the Center: Confronting Evangelical Accommodation in Postmodern Times (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2004), 328-29. [back]Ibid., 330. [back]Millard J. Erickson, Truth or Consequences: The Promise & Perils of Postmodernism (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 234. [back]Stan Wallace, “The Real Issue: Discerning and Defining the Essentials of Postmodernism.” Online here. [back]J. P. Moreland, “What is Truth and Why Does It Matter”. Online here. [back]Douglas Groothuis, “Truth Defined and Defended,” in Millard J. Erickson, Paul Kjoss Helseth, and Justin Taylor, eds., Reclaiming the Center: Confronting Evangelical Accommodation in Postmodern Times (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2004), 79. [back]Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (London: SCM Press, 1962), 257. The Latin term used in philosophy to express this idea of agreement was adaequatio. Thomas Aquinas replaced it with correspondentia from which we get the ‘correspondence theory of truth’. [back]Ibid., 262. [back]In The Essence of Truth Heidegger asks. “And what is the true? The true is what is known. It is just what corresponds with the facts. The proposition corresponds with what is known in knowledge; thus with what is true. The true? So does the correspondence of the proposition amount to correspondence with something corresponding? A fine definition! Truth is correspondence with a correspondence, the latter itself corresponds with a correspondence, and so forth. [...] What presents itself as self-evident is utterly obscure”(Martin Heidegger, The Essence Of Truth: On Plato’s Cave Allegory and Theaetetus [n.p.: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2002], 2-3). [back]Heidegger reads Plato’s cave allegory as a story of unveiling, of bringing the hidden to unhiddenness (α-ληθεια). Correspondence does not even play a role there at all. [back]Ibid., 259. [back]And along with it the separation (and later, correspondance) between the real and the ideal. [back]K. Scott Oliphint’s review of Millard J. Erickson, Paul Kjoss Helseth, and Justin Taylor, eds., Reclaiming the Center: Confronting Evangelical Accommodation in Postmodern Times (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2004). Online here. [back]Cornelius Van Til, A Survey of Christian Epistemology (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1980), 1-2. [back]Ibid., 2-3. [back]Ibid., 3-4. [back] Nailed to the door of the castle church on November 23rd, 2005 Filed under: Apologetics | | trackback [...]

]]> By: Laurence O. http://blog.solagratia.org/2005/11/17/foundationalism-antifoundationalism-the-scylla-and-charybdis-of-epistemology/#comment-28 Laurence O. Wed, 23 Nov 2005 03:40:17 +0000 http://blog.solagratia.org/?p=26#comment-28 Thanks for the great resource leads. And I'll look forward to your book, D.V. :-) Thanks for the great resource leads. And I’ll look forward to your book, D.V. :-)

]]> By: Sebastian Heck http://blog.solagratia.org/2005/11/17/foundationalism-antifoundationalism-the-scylla-and-charybdis-of-epistemology/#comment-27 Sebastian Heck Wed, 23 Nov 2005 00:34:22 +0000 http://blog.solagratia.org/?p=26#comment-27 Concerning your second question: Frame primarily and seriously weakens Van Til's transcendental argument by reconstruing it until it looks a lot like any other argument (traditional type proof). For example, he rejects the uniqueness of the transcendental argument over against probability arguments (a la Butler). Sources substantiating this claim are really not that hard to find in Frame's own writings. But there has also been a fairly recent exchange on that very issue in the Westminster Theological Journal. Here are some sources: Don Collett, "Van Til and Transcendental Argument," Westminster Theological Journal 65 no. 2 (Fall 2003): 289-306. John Frame, “Reply to Don Collett on Transcendental Argument.” Westminster Theological Journal 65 no. 2 (Fall 2003): 307-10. John Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God, 77-81 and many other places. Greg Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic. Readings and Analysis (a lot of critical references to Frame's interpretation of the TA). John Frame, Cornelius Van Til. An Analysis of His Thought, p.45 and the entire chapter 23. And, yes, I have written a paper on the current state of affairs of the transcendental argument in apologetics and am in the process of submitting it for publication. Concerning your second question: Frame primarily and seriously weakens Van Til’s transcendental argument by reconstruing it until it looks a lot like any other argument (traditional type proof). For example, he rejects the uniqueness of the transcendental argument over against probability arguments (a la Butler).
Sources substantiating this claim are really not that hard to find in Frame’s own writings. But there has also been a fairly recent exchange on that very issue in the Westminster Theological Journal. Here are some sources:

Don Collett, “Van Til and Transcendental Argument,” Westminster Theological Journal 65 no. 2 (Fall 2003): 289-306.

John Frame, “Reply to Don Collett on Transcendental Argument.” Westminster Theological Journal 65 no. 2 (Fall 2003): 307-10.

John Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God, 77-81 and many other places.

Greg Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic. Readings and Analysis (a lot of critical references to Frame’s interpretation of the TA).

John Frame, Cornelius Van Til. An Analysis of His Thought, p.45 and the entire chapter 23.

And, yes, I have written a paper on the current state of affairs of the transcendental argument in apologetics and am in the process of submitting it for publication.

]]> By: Laurence O. http://blog.solagratia.org/2005/11/17/foundationalism-antifoundationalism-the-scylla-and-charybdis-of-epistemology/#comment-26 Laurence O. Tue, 22 Nov 2005 17:55:48 +0000 http://blog.solagratia.org/?p=26#comment-26 Thank you for the article. I think I'm tracking with you, though I do have two questions. (1) It seems like your argument is solid in the realm of reason, but how does your "Reformed epistemology" (a) avoid pressing the human limits of finite rationality, (b) account for empirical reality/experience, and (c) account for existential reality/experience? (2) I don't see where/how John Frame weaken's Van Til's transcendental argument. Have you written anything regarding this claim, or can you point me to something I could read about this? Thank you for the article.

I think I’m tracking with you, though I do have two questions.

(1) It seems like your argument is solid in the realm of reason, but how does your “Reformed epistemology” (a) avoid pressing the human limits of finite rationality, (b) account for empirical reality/experience, and (c) account for existential reality/experience?

(2) I don’t see where/how John Frame weaken’s Van Til’s transcendental argument. Have you written anything regarding this claim, or can you point me to something I could read about this?

]]> By: Reformata - A Reformed Blog » http://blog.solagratia.org/2005/11/17/foundationalism-antifoundationalism-the-scylla-and-charybdis-of-epistemology/#comment-24 Reformata - A Reformed Blog » Tue, 22 Nov 2005 12:25:33 +0000 http://blog.solagratia.org/?p=26#comment-24 [...] The line of thinking goes: if God is admitted as foundational in any sense to your theology (which it must be if you want to be a Christian), then you are a foundationalist. So there! Two problems with this: (1) This does not justice at all to what thinking men (and women) call "foundationalism". Therefore, it will be considered to be a strawman by Franke and the likes - and not without justification. (2) To see why I object to this default mode (and why I believe even a "biblical foundationalism" is the stealth mode of an unbiblical epistemology), see my earlier post here. Nailed to the door of the castle church on November 22nd, 2005 Filed under: Apologetics | | trackback [...] [...] The line of thinking goes: if God is admitted as foundational in any sense to your theology (which it must be if you want to be a Christian), then you are a foundationalist. So there! Two problems with this: (1) This does not justice at all to what thinking men (and women) call “foundationalism”. Therefore, it will be considered to be a strawman by Franke and the likes - and not without justification. (2) To see why I object to this default mode (and why I believe even a “biblical foundationalism” is the stealth mode of an unbiblical epistemology), see my earlier post here. Nailed to the door of the castle church on November 22nd, 2005 Filed under: Apologetics | | trackback [...]

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