There has been somewhat of an interesting discussion recently in the blogosphere with regard to the relationship between a rejection of foundationalism and relativism & skepticism. One of the contributors at our own blog, Paul Helm, put forth a response at the Alliance site to critical comments made by Steve Bush concerning Helm’s review of Franke’s book, The Character of Theology. Following soon after Bush’s initial criticism, David Decosimo from Roundtower also weighed in, accused Helm of misunderstanding foundationalism, and then proceeded to essentially argue against a classical account of foundationalism (although I agree with James Anderson’s observation that David’s critique could be read as a broader criticism of all forms of foundationalism [such as externalist versions of foundationalism advocated by people like Alvin Plantinga or internalist versions advocated by people like Laurence BonJour]), all the while assuming that Helm was or is committed to defending a classical form of foundationalism (which seems unwarranted in so far as I can tell).

Additionally, although David seems to lay the responsibility for confusion about the meaning and significance of foundationalism at the feet of evangelicals like Helm, it seems to me that this confusion may be more properly attributable to the nonfoundationalist “postconservatives”¹ for 1) a general failure to distinguish between the various strains of foundationalism (David himself didn’t do a particularly sound job in this regard), 2) attacking [what some consider to be] idiosyncratic versions of foundationalism (i.e., the classical type), and 3) the disingenuous characterization of Reformed epistemologists like Plantinga as “…nonfoundationalist and decidedly postmodern” (Stanley J. Grenz and John R. Franke, Beyond Foundationalism (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), p.47). Perhaps blame for the confusion can justifiably be attributed to some evangelicals as well, but let’s at least acknowledge the sources of that confusion in all camps, eh David?

In any event, one of the critiques I have of the Grenz & Franke proposal also focuses on the subjectivism that seems to hopelessly engulf their proposal - not as a result of their rejection of foundationalism per se (one could certainly press the case [via an epistemic regress argument] that a denial of properly basic non-inferential beliefs renders reasonable belief impossible and [consequently] creates an impassable chasm between objective truth and one’s epistemic access to that truth - leading to skepticism),² but because of how they construe the role of Scripture in their proposal for theological method.

Additionally, I have often wondered why [the late] Stan Grenz & John Franke and their theological proxies have seemed so surprised at the attempt to tag their proposal as subjectivist by many of their critics. Grenz & Franke have made many explicit statements in Beyond Foundationalism, which [rightfully] exposes the non-foundationalist project to these charges of subjectivism:

Lindbeck’s use of Wittgenstein has far reaching implications for the concept of truth. He notes that rules of grammar are routinely stated in the form of propositions; nevertheless, asking whether any one of them is objectively “true” or “false” involves a fundamental misunderstanding of the type of proposition the rule in fact is. It entails ripping the assertion out of its context and treating it apart from its regulative role within the language itself. These rules are not intended to say anything true about a reality external to the language they regulate. Hence, each rule is only “true” in the context of the body of rules that govern the language to which the rules belong. Lindbeck suggests that we might view doctrinal statements in a similar manner. Seen from this perspective, such statements do not make “first-order” truth claims; they do not assert something objective about reality.³

Quotations like the preceding could be multiplied nearly ad infinitum.⁴

The remainder of this entry will put forth a few additional critiques of Grenz & Franke’s proposal for “doing theology” in a postmodern context, especially as their proposal relates to Scripture.

In their book Beyond Foundationalism, Stanley Grenz and John Franke have suggested a provocative proposal for construing theological method in the postmodern context. The impetus for their proposal comes from the perceived collapse of the “modernist” worldview and the resultant and contemporary postmodern cultural setting.

The authors suggest that the traditional theological categories of “liberal” and “conservative” no longer function as adequate typologies because of the fragmentation occurring within both camps. The authors also argue that these typologies fail to take into account those theologians in both camps who reject traditional modernist assumptions and who desire to take the postmodern cultural milieu seriously.

In light of these factors, the authors have proposed a new theological method which construes the theological task as a conversation [what else!] among three participants (Scripture, tradition, and culture), which, when taken together, form the sources for theology in their proposal.

Additionally, the authors argue that there are three focal motifs (a Trinitarian content, a communitarian focus, and an eschatological orientation) that provide coherence to their scheme and which, they argue, make their theology distinctively Christian.

THE ROLE OF SCRIPTURE
Grenz and Franke conceive of theology as the product which emerges from a dialogue among three participants: Scripture, tradition, and culture. Although they construe theology as a dialogue among these participants, they nevertheless argue for the priority of one of the conversational partners (Scripture), by presenting it as the normative and final authority for the church.

It is important to note though that the authors make a significant qualification with regard to the nature of the Bible’s authority. They argue that the normative authority of the Bible does not come from the text of Scripture in and of itself, but rather derives from the voice of the Spirit who speaks to us through the text today (In other words, the authors propose a tight and essential connection between the theological concept of illumination and biblical authority). Therefore, in this proposal, the Spirit speaking through text serves an essential identity forming function for the church.

The authors acknowledge that their proposal of tightly linking the authority of the Bible to the concept of illumination might appear to open the door to subjectivism (Beyond Foundationalism, p. 67), but they believe that are able to avoid this conclusion by appealing to the priority of the community over the individual (Beyond Foundationalism, p. 68). We should note that “post-conservative” advocates repeatedly & strenuously reject any suggestion that they are silly relativists. In spite of these denials, however, one wonders whether Grenz & Franke are, in fact, able to surmount the subjectivism that seems (to many) to be innate to their proposal.

One must ask, for example, if their explanation (i.e., the appeal to the priority of the community over the individual) really does remove the specter of subjectivism that looms large after one has [essentially] linked the Bible’s normative authority to illumination. Although the authors argue that Scripture’s status as divine revelation does not depend on an individual recognition of the Spirit’s voice as speaking through it, they acknowledge that it does depend on a communal reception (as the community of the church testifies that God speaks through the Bible). And yet, this explanation seems to suffer from a few substantial difficulties.

First, the authors have a rather irritating habit of reifying impersonal entities (most especially in their references to “the church” and “the community”), and this becomes an essential part of their response to the danger of relativism. Not only do we wonder what exactly the authors mean by “the church” and/or “the community,” we’re not quite sure what they mean when they refer to its alleged testimony. Does “the community” have a personal identity which allows it to engage in personal activities such as speaking and writing?

Second, consider the vast diversity among the Christian communities themselves. Not only is there tremendous diversity within particular ecclesiastical communions, but the situation is even more chaotic at a cross-confessional level! Therefore, one must ask whether an appeal to a particular distinct community (which is but one among many) provides any substantive or meaningful degree of objectivity to this proposal. Think, for a moment, just of the differences that exist among Christians with regard to the extent of the canon.

Consider this statement from the book:

Rather, the Bible remains objectively scripture because it is the book of the church. From its inception, the community of Christ–following the lead of the ancient Jewish community (e.g., Neh. 8:1-8)–has been a people who gather around the text to hear the Spirit’s voice speaking through it. And throughout the ages this community has testified that the sovereign Spirit has spoken–and continues to speak–through the pages of the Bible. (Beyond Foundationalism, p. 68)

To be sure, the authors claim that the Bible is objectively Scripture in their proposal, but is it really? For example, which Bible is objectively Scripture – Protestant or Catholic? Further, since “Scripture” forms a source of theology in this proposal, one wonders whether Baruch, Sirach, and Tobit will be conversational participants, and if not, what exactly constitutes the objective basis for such a decision.

Finally (and perhaps this is the formal cause of the previous difficulty), it seems that merely widening the sphere of receptivity from the individual to the community doesn’t solve the dilemma of subjectivity. Certainly it can be admitted that widening the sphere from the individual lends to an appearance of decreasing subjectivity, but what is one to make of the conflicting “Spirit’s message” that emerges from the widely divergent communities themselves? Has the problem of relativity really been minimized in any substantive way in this schema? I cannot help but think that it has not. Therefore, while I appreciate the emphasis on the priority accorded to Scripture in their proposal, it’s tight and inextricable linkage between the authority of the Bible and the concept of illumination seems unable to surmount the challenge of subjectivity that is inherent in their proposal.

In spite of their profuse denials to the contrary then, the affirmation that the Bible derives its normative authority from the communal reception of the church (instead of the inspired text of Scripture in and of itself) leaves Grenz and Franke’s proposal hopelessly lost in the uncertain realm of subjectivism.

End Notes
1 Postconservative is an interesting term, but I’m not sure I understand it. I get the “post” part (I think), but for the life of me, I have never been able to quite figure out what is “conservative” about Grenz, Franke, et al, and what substantially distinguishes them from Frei, Lindbeck, and the “postliberals.” As one of my more distinguished professors at TEDS (who shall remain nameless) remarked in my advanced theological prolegomena seminar: “They [the postconservatives] have the whiff of the postliberal about them.” Indeed.

2. In other words, in the absence of noninferentially justified beliefs, it would seem that we would need to complete an infinite number of infinitely long chains of reasoning in order to be justified in believing anything at all.

3 Beyond Foundationalism, pp. 45-46.

4 Note for example the [non]-answer that the author’s give to their own question “Why give primacy to the world-constructing language of the Christian community?”:

As Christians we would likely respond by asserting that we believe that the Christian theological vision is true. But on what basis can we make this claim? Must we now finally appeal to some court beyond the Christian faith itself, some rational “first-principle” that supposedly carries universality? In the end, must we inevitably retreat to a foundationalist epistemology?

Here, we suggest, the wedding of communitarian and pragmatist insights offers assistance. Communitarians remind us that the goal of all social traditions is to construct a well-ordered society, although the various communities might well differ from ech other as to what that society entails. This observation leads us to inquire as to which theological vision for the construction of the kind of world that particular theologizing community is in fact seeking? Which theological vision provides the framework for the construction of the true community? We believe that Christian theology, focused as it is on God as the triunity of persons and on humankind as the imago dei, sets forth a helpful vision of the nature of the kind of community that all religious belief systems in their own way and according to their own understanding seek to foster. This vision, we maintain, provides the best transcendent basis for the human ideal of life-in-relationship, for it looks to the divine life as a plurality-in-unity as the basis for understanding what it means to be human persons-in-community.

The task of systematic theology is to show how the Christian mosaic of beliefs offers a transcendent vision of the glorious eschatological community that God wills for God’s own creation and how this vision provides a coherent foundation for life-in-relationship in this penultimate age, life that ought to be visible in the community of Christ as the sign of the age to come. Implicit in the construction of a coherent presentation of the Christian vision is a claim to “validity,” a claim that, however, does not look to a universally accessible present reality for confirmation but anticipates the eschatological completion the universally directed program of the God of the Bible. The task of a helpful theological method, in turn, is to set forth a program for the shaping of a theology that can carry out the theological vocation in a manner that is solidly biblical and truly Christian and that takes seriously the postmodern situation. — Beyond Foundationalism, p. 54 [emphasis added]