Comments on: Leithart and Franke on Postfoundationalism http://blog.solagratia.org/2005/11/22/33/ Dealing with issues in reformed theology. Wed, 07 Jan 2009 02:07:20 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.6 By: C. Ryan Jenkins http://blog.solagratia.org/2005/11/22/33/#comment-25 C. Ryan Jenkins Tue, 22 Nov 2005 17:04:29 +0000 http://blog.solagratia.org/2005/11/22/33/#comment-25 Sebastian, Leithart seems to have an implied criticism of Franke's taxonomy (and particularly Franke's classification of his own view as "non-foundationalist") in the following quote from the post you cite: <blockquote>"It also means that this belief is more fully integrated in all his other beliefs than minor beliefs - so that changing this belief would cause his whole structure - oops, make that "web" - of beliefs to collapse. Franke calls this position non-foundationalism, which is his right of course. But as he pointed out in his lecture this is not too distant from what others call 'soft foundationalism.'"</blockquote> If I have read Leithart correctly, I am in agreement with this criticism. One of my major critiques of Franke has been his overly narrow and unduly restrictive definition of what exactly constitutes "foundationalist thought." Franke focuses exclusively on an infallibilist type of doxastic foundationalism and he repeatedly equates <i>that</i> with "foundationalism" [this is one of the reasons he mistakenly identifies broad foundationalists like Plantinga as "non-foundationalists" in his works]. He makes no distinction [that I have found] between (1) structural and substantive foundationalism, (2) doxastic and non-doxastic accounts of <i>what</i> exactly constitutes a properly basic foundation, and (3) fallibilist and infallibilist versions [which is a further distinction within doxastic foundationalism]. If he has made these important distinctions, I wish that (1) someone would point me to them, (2) he would very carefully qualify what type of “foundationalism” he is opposed to by using a consistent designation for that specific form of foundationalism throughout [unless of course he truly is antagonistic to <i>all</i> forms of foundationalism – something that Leithart and others seem to be suspicious of]. I want to make this point too - I have substantial difficulty with Franke's proposal for theological method that extends beyond his rejection of a particular theory about the structure of knowledge. Additionally, the very complex subject of "certainty" needs to be carefully defined in any discussion of this type. I may make some preliminary comments about this concept shortly. Sebastian,

Leithart seems to have an implied criticism of Franke’s taxonomy (and particularly Franke’s classification of his own view as “non-foundationalist”) in the following quote from the post you cite:

“It also means that this belief is more fully integrated in all his other beliefs than minor beliefs - so that changing this belief would cause his whole structure - oops, make that “web” - of beliefs to collapse. Franke calls this position non-foundationalism, which is his right of course. But as he pointed out in his lecture this is not too distant from what others call ’soft foundationalism.’”

If I have read Leithart correctly, I am in agreement with this criticism. One of my major critiques of Franke has been his overly narrow and unduly restrictive definition of what exactly constitutes “foundationalist thought.”

Franke focuses exclusively on an infallibilist type of doxastic foundationalism and he repeatedly equates that with “foundationalism” [this is one of the reasons he mistakenly identifies broad foundationalists like Plantinga as "non-foundationalists" in his works].

He makes no distinction [that I have found] between (1) structural and substantive foundationalism, (2) doxastic and non-doxastic accounts of what exactly constitutes a properly basic foundation, and (3) fallibilist and infallibilist versions [which is a further distinction within doxastic foundationalism].

If he has made these important distinctions, I wish that (1) someone would point me to them, (2) he would very carefully qualify what type of “foundationalism” he is opposed to by using a consistent designation for that specific form of foundationalism throughout [unless of course he truly is antagonistic to all forms of foundationalism – something that Leithart and others seem to be suspicious of].

I want to make this point too - I have substantial difficulty with Franke’s proposal for theological method that extends beyond his rejection of a particular theory about the structure of knowledge.

Additionally, the very complex subject of “certainty” needs to be carefully defined in any discussion of this type. I may make some preliminary comments about this concept shortly.

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