Is ethical egoism internally coherent? We should hasten to add that in asking such a question we are not asking whether ethical egoism is good or correct. The latter is a legitimate and important question in its own right, but it is quite distinct from the former, and the answer to that question exceeds the scope of this current examination in any event.

In asking whether ethical egoism is internally coherent, we are interested in learning whether it is able to offer a consistent moral vision, which has a substantial bearing on its viability to function as a norm for moral conduct.¹

Before we can begin to answer the question of whether ethical egoism can (coherently and plausibly) serve as an ultimate moral norm, however, we must first define our terms.

Definition of Terms
Egoism is a broad term that includes any normative or descriptive theory which advocates maximizing one’s own good.² The descriptive form of egoism, psychological egoism, is an empirical theory of ethics which deals with how people, in fact, do act. Psychological egoism seeks to convincingly explain what motivates people to act as they do. According to the psychological egoist, people always act to further their own perceived best interests.³

The normative form of egoism, ethical egoism, is a teleological theory of ethics which deals with how people ought to act. As such it competes with other normative theories for acceptance as a standard for moral conduct. According to this theory people should act according to their own perceived best interests.

Ethical egoism can be further classified according to the following four-fold taxonomy:⁴

(1) Individual ethical egoism:

(2) Universal ethical egoism:

(3) Categorical ethical egoism:

(4) Hypothetical ethical egoism:

Having defined our terms, we are now in position to address our original question concerning whether ethical egoism is a coherent moral theory. William Frankena and Brian Medlin have taken up this question and they level searching criticism against the internal consistency of ethical egoism.⁵

Both argue that ethical egoism can be demonstrated to be incoherent once the move is made from individual to universal egoism. As a result, both assert that it is unable to function as a plausible norm for ethical conduct.

In response, Jesse Kalin has risen to the defense of ethical egoism, and he offers answers to the specific objections raised by both Frankena and Medlin.⁶ Although Kalin acknowledges certain weaknesses inherent in ethical egoism, he believes that it is, at the very least, internally consistent and able to function as a viable norm for ethical conduct.

Is Kalin successful in his attempt to rescue ethical egoism from the charges of internal incoherence? This series of posts will attempt to answer this pivotal question. We will begin [in this post] by briefly reviewing the criticisms of ethical egoism made by Frankena and Medlin together with Kalin’s response to those criticisms. We will then analyze Kalin’s response in the following post with a view toward determining whether Kalin has successfully rescued ethical egoism from charges of incoherence.

Frankena’s & Medlin’s Criticism of Ethical Egoism and Kalin’s Response
William Frankena argues that ethical egoism, in its universal and categorical form, cannot provide the necessary criteria that are requisite for making consistent moral judgments. Frankena stipulates that, given ethical egoism, the following principles must inform ethical parenesis:

(1)

(2)

However, (1) and (2), when taken together, produce contradictory moral judgments when people’s self-interests conflict. Suppose person X does action y, and suppose also that action y is in person X’s overall best interest, but contrary to the interest of person Z. According to categorical and universal egoism, is action y right or wrong?

It depends on who is making the judgment. If X is making the judgment, then (applying principle 1) “X ought to do action y” is correct. If Z is making the judgment, then (applying principle 2) “X ought not to do action y” is correct. When both persons make simultaneous judgments, both “X ought to do action y” and “X ought not to do action y” are correct. As we see, when people’s interests are incompatible, this theory provides contradictory moral guidance, and is therefore, to be rejected as an ultimate norm for ethical conduct.

In response to Frankena, Kalin acknowledges that if one accepts Frankena’s formulation of ethical egoism concerning first-, second-, and third-person moral judgments, egoism must be abandoned as incoherent. Recall how Frankena formulates the parenetic principles underlying ethical egoism:

(1)

(2)

To rescue ethical egoism, Kalin affirms the propriety of principle (1), but he replaces principle (2) with the following:

(3)

Kalin begins by arguing that both (1) & (3) are consistent with the spirit of ethical egoism.⁷ Further, when the doctrine is reformulated in this way, ethical egoism will never provide inconsistent moral guidance. We will examine shortly whether Kalin’s response here is successful.

As we noted, Brian Medlin also attacks the internal consistency of ethical egoism. Medlin’s assault proceeds along the following lines. He begins by arguing that the ethical egoist must defend both the universal and categorical forms of egoism.

Against the individual form of ethical egoism, Medlin notes how implausible and absurd it is for a person (say “Tom”) to attempt to persuade anyone else (let alone everyone else) to serve Tom’s own personal interests regardless of their own personal interests. If Tom is unable to convince everyone else to serve his own personal best interests, then how can such a theory serve as a norm for moral conduct? Therefore, since individual ethical egoism cannot plausibly be promulgated, it does not meet the necessary condition of universality that a normative moral theory requires.

Against the hypothetical form of ethical egoism, Medlin argues that it is not, in fact, real egoism at all, but rather utilitarianism falsely clothed in egoistic dress. Thus, he argues, the hypothetical egoist who argues that everyone ought to look after their own best interests for the best interests of all is really a utilitarian, which is evident by the appeal to a utilitarian justification for self-interested action.

Medlin summarizes his preliminary moves, which locks the egoist into a defense of universal and categorical egoism:

An ethical egoist will have to maintain the doctrine in both its universal and categorical forms. Should he retreat to hypothetical egoism he is no longer an egoist. Should he retreat to individual egoism his doctrine, while logically impregnable, is no longer ethical, no longer even a doctrine.⁸

Having thus excluded both the individual and hypothetical forms of ethical egoism, Medlin demonstrates that the universal and categorical type is unable to function as a viable norm for moral conduct because it produces conflicting parenetic advice.

Recall that, as a universal and categorical ethical egoist, I believe that I ought to desire and pursue my own self-interests and I must also believe that everyone else ought to desire and pursue their own self-interests. However, what happens when my own self interests come into conflict with someone else’s interests?

Let us assume, for example, that Tom’s interests collide with my own interests. With categorical and universal egoism as my normative guide I must want Tom’s non-interference and for myself to come out on top while at the same time approving of Tom’s desire for my non-interference and for himself to come out on top.⁹

This is the crux of the problem for the ethical egoist, whenever my interests come into conflict with someone else’s interests; as an egoist, I must inevitably approve of inconsistent ends and will want incompatible things. Therefore, ethical egoism cannot serve as an ultimate ethical norm because it leads to inconsistent ethical guidance. Therefore, Medlin argues:

For we assert our ultimate principles not only to express our own attitudes but also to induce similar attitudes in others, to dispose them to conduct themselves as we wish. In so far as their desires conflict, people don’t know what to do. And, therefore, no expression of incompatible desires can ever serve for an ultimate principle of human conduct.¹⁰

In response to Medlin, Kalin notes that although his reformulation of the underlying principles of ethical egoism have allowed him to circumvent Frankena’s criticism, it still leaves him vulnerable to the criticism of Medlin. Recall that central to Medlin’s argument is the supposition that the egoist must approve all egoistic actions, both his own and those of others. When his own interests come into conflict with someone else’s interests, his system produces inconsistent desires – he approves and wants both for himself to come out on top and for his opponent to come out on top.

In response, Kalin takes issue with Medlin’s use of approbation (i.e., according to Medlin approval of egoistic action also includes wanting that action to come about). Kalin argues that it is possible for someone to approve of egoistic action, without wanting that action to actually happen. To substantiate his point, Kalin draws on an analogy from the world of competitive sport. He argues that it is possible to believe that that an opponent ought to try to succeed without wanting them to actually succeed. In fact, he argues that one can believe that an opponent ought to try to succeed in competition while at the same time actively trying to prevent their success. Kalin summarizes his response to Medlin:

Medlin’s mistake is to think that believing that A ought to do y commits one to wanting A to do y and hence to encouraging or otherwise helping A to do y. The examples from competitive games show that this needn’t be so.¹¹

Therefore, according to Kalin, while ethical egoism commits an egoist to approving all egoistic action, it only commits him/her to wanting his/her own welfare, not the welfare of anyone else.

As we have seen, both Frankena and Medlin exploit what they perceive to be inconsistencies involved in the universalization of ethical egoism. Jesse Kalin has risen to the defense of the coherence of ethical egoism, but is he successful? It is to this question that we will turn in our following post.

1. Throughout this post, the terms “ethical” and “moral” are used interchangeably and synonymously with one another.↩
2. What is “good” is debatable and depends upon whether one opts for an account of “good” that is based on preference/desire or something more objective (e.g., the possession of certain states such as virtue, knowledge, or something else that is valued regardless of whether it is desired or not). Shaver, Robert, “Egoism“, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2002 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).↩
3. Thomas Hobbes’ Magnum opus, Leviathan, for example, is based on an underlying theory of psychological egoism. According to Hobbes, since people always act to further their own self-interests (often to the detriment of their fellow man), it is evident that people must contract together to respect a certain minimal morality. This moral law must be enforced by a powerful sovereign (Leviathan) who will impose penal sanctions on lawbreakers.↩
4. The definitions for individual and ethical egoism are taken from Louis P. Pojman, Ethical Theory: Classical and Contemporary Readings, 4th ed. (Belmont, Ca.: Wadsworth Publishing, 2002), 63-64. The definitions for categorical and hypothetical egoism are taken from Brian Medlin, “Ultimate Principles and Ethical Egoism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, XXXV (1957): 111-118.↩
5. Ibid., 111-118; William Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), 16-18.↩
6. Jesse Kalin, “In Defense of Egoism,” in Morality and Rational Self-interest, edited by David Gauthier (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1970), 64-87.↩
7. Kalin defines egoism as “A person ought to do a specific action, all things considered, if and only if that action is in that person’s overall (enlightened) self-interest.” Kalin, “In Defense of Egoism,” 66.↩
8. Medlin, “Ultimate Principles and Ethical Egoism,” 113-14.↩
9. Jesse Kalin helpfully summarizes Medlin’s argument in the following manner: “We can now explain Medlin’s conclusion that ‘the proper objection to the man who says “Everyone should look after his own interests regardless of the interests of others” is not that he isn’t speaking the truth, but simply that he isn’t speaking.’ Upon analysis, it is clear that the egoist is “saying” that others should act so that he himself comes out on top and should not care about Tom, Dick, et al., but they should also act so that Tom comes out on top and should not care about himself, Dick, the others, and so forth. This person appears to be saying how people should act, and that they should act in a definite way. But his ‘directions’ can guide no one. They give one nothing to do. Therefore, such a man has in fact said nothing.” Kalin, “In Defense of Egoism,” 73.↩
10. Medlin, “Ultimate Principles and Ethical Egoism,” 118.↩
11. Kalin, “In Defense of Egoism,” 74.↩