Because of John Calvin’s prestige as a great doctor of the Church attempts have from time to time been made to ‘capture’ him for some particular theological claim or agenda. Examples are Karl Barth’s appeal to Calvin in his conflict with Emil Brunner over the issue of natural theology, and Abraham Kuyper’s and Herman Bavinck’s claim that by his doctrine of common grace Calvin overturned the medieval nature - grace dichotomy or dualism.

In each case those appealing to Calvin have treated his ideas anachronistically (Each of these is discussed in Paul Helm, John Calvin’s Ideas, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004)). In writing that book I discovered that if one uses Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae as a kind of template, then there are remarkable coincidences between Thomas’s thought and Calvin’s, even though there are obvious stylistic differences, and very little internal evidence in Calvin of a direct influence.

What does this coincidence show? At least, that Calvin was thoroughly at home in the thought world of the theology of late medievalism, taking on many of its ideas uncritically in areas where the issues of the Reformation were not at stake. Even though he had, from time to time, critical things to say of that theology, or rather of its speculative tendencies.
(Continue Reading…)

This sixth installment of our Postmodern epistemology series will provide a quick (and all too superficial) survey of the last of the so-called transitional figures who have been influential in the development of “Postmodern Epistemology” - Martin Heidegger.

Martin Heidegger (1889-1976)

The German philosopher Martin Heidegger (who in his own words attempts to take Nietzsche especially seriously as a thinker) is deeply concerned with overcoming the subject/object-dichotomy which (although extant even in ancient Greek philosophy) has been brought to particular prominence in the philosophy of Enlightenment figures such as Descartes and later Kant.

In order to surmount this dichotomy, Heidegger brushes aside any abstract notion of being and replaces it with Dasein (Being-there). Over and against the Cartesian-Kantian understanding of the self which stands squarely opposite external objects, Heidegger wants to know of the self only in terms of a Dasein.
(Continue Reading…)

Our fifth installment in the “Postmodern Epistemology” series will briefly survey a few features in the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche that have helped shape postmodern thinking.

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900)

The German philosopher Jürgen Habermas (himself a proponent of modernity) refers to Nietzsche’s thought as the “entry into postmodernity.” According to Habermas, Nietzsche refuses to furnish a new definition of reason in his writing and work of philosophy and rather he “bids farewell to the dialectic of enlightenment”¹ altogether, and he consequently introduces a kind of irrationalism instead.

Nietzsche has been labeled a nihilist, an aestheticist and a relativist/perspectivist. In point of fact, his thought probably contains elements of all of these.
(Continue Reading…)

1. Habermas in Erickson, Truth, 85.↩

Transitional Figures

In this fourth installment of our “Postmodern Epistemology” series, we now turn from the Modern Precursors (René Descartes and Immanuel Kant) to three “Transitional Figures:” Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) and Martin Heidegger (1889-1976).

These transitional figures are thinkers who are most often viewed as neither modern (in any true sense) nor postmodern.¹ The most important of this group for our purposes are Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Heidegger.
(Continue Reading…)

1. Since postmodernism is often considered to have begun sometime after WW II (some say perhaps in the 1970s) it would be anachronistic to consider these figures postmodern, even though they might have done more to ultimately shape postmodernism than anyone else.↩

As we suggested in our latest post, advocates of the libertarian reconciliation project (LRP) and the compatibilist reconciliation project (CRP) each offer different accounts of divine sovereignty and human freedom.

As we also previously averred, we believe that the CRP holds out the most promise for a successful reconciliation of the prima facie tension that exists between divine sovereignty and human freedom since it is (1) internally consistent (i.e., it forms a self-consistent set), and (2) externally consistent with the biblical data (as this post will labor to demonstrate).

Further, the specific proposals treated as generally representative of the LRP seem to be burdened with insurmountable difficulties (as we will also hope to see in this post).¹
(Continue Reading…)

1. As noted in the previous installment, we must remember that the LRP (as well as the CRP) can be represented by an indefinite number of specific proposals, so the failure of a particular reconciliation attempt does not by itself discredit its project type. We have used the proposals set forth by Cottrell, Marshall, and Pinnock (as cited in the previous post) since we believe them to be generally representative of many of the standard arguments put forth by other advocates of the LRP. Nevertheless, even if their specific arguments can be discredited, this would not fatally damage the LRP since other proposals from this project might be able to overcome the problems noted in this series of posts↩

Throughout history Christians have debated the questions surrounding God’s sovereignty and human freedom and especially how these concepts relate to one another. As David Basinger has succinctly pointed out, Christians have normally wished to affirm both of the following tenets:

The problem of affirming both tenets simultaneously, however, creates a prima facie conflict. If one first assumes T1 (i.e., that humans are causally and therefore morally responsible for certain states of affairs), it is difficult to see how God can bring about the exact state of affairs he desires in every case, and therefore difficult to affirm that he is totally in control of everything in any meaningful sense (as T2 affirms). A similar dilemma occurs in relation to human freedom if one first assumes T2.²
(Continue Reading…)

1. David Basinger, “Divine Control and Human Freedom: Is Middle Knowledge the Answer?,” JETS 36/1 (March 1993): 54.↩
2. Ibid., 54↩

The Reformed doctrine of limited atonement (or particular redemption as I prefer to call it) limits the scope of the vicarious sin-bearing aspects of Christ’s atoning work to the elect. The doctrine states that Christ came to earth to die vicariously for the elect in accord with the eternal (and unified) purpose of the Triune God. According to this Reformed doctrine, God elects some for salvation, Christ dies for these elect, and the Spirit efficaciously works in the elect to actually save them.

In contrast to the Reformed doctrine, Amyraldianism (a label occasionally given to “4-point” Calvinists - so named after Moises Amyraut) views Christ’s cross work as universalistic in nature. Amyraldian’s believe that the Bible teaches that Christ died for each individual although they do not believe it teaches that all people have been elected to salvation by God or that all people will actually be saved.

The question is often asked then: why would God elect only some for salvation and yet still send His son to die for those whom He had not elected? (Continue Reading…)

In this third installment of our “Postmodern Epistemology” series. (see Part I and Part II for previous installments), we will briefly summarize the two Modern Precursors that we have surveyed thus far. We will then follow with an extended critique in subsequent posts.

Summary of Modernism

In the two modernistic thinkers that we have surveyed thus far (Descartes and Kant), we encounter elements in the philosophy of each that postmodernism comes to reject in addition to elements that postmodernism whole-heartedly embraces and develops.
(Continue Reading…)

In this second installment of our Postmodern Epistemology series, we will turn to the other significant modern precursor to postmodern thought: Immanuel Kant.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)

Admittedly, Kant’s inclusion among the figures that we identify as historical precursors to postmodernism may indeed raise some eyebrows. After all, was not Kant still very modern with his idealist attempt to save knowledge and make room for faith?

It is true that in many respects Kant is very much the modern figure (and from merely a historical standpoint he certainly is). Nevertheless, there are features of his philosophy (especially as it pertains to epistemology) which paves the road for a postmodern crisis of epistemology.
(Continue Reading…)

This is the first installment of a series on the “Epistemology of Postmodernism.”

Let us begin with a brief overview of the series: In the first three installments we will survey two “Modern Precursors” to postmodernism - René Descartes and Immanuel Kant. We will briefly summarize and evaluate each figure.

In the next four installments we will survey three “Transitional Figures” to postmodernism - Søren Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger. Likewise, we will briefly summarize and evaluate each of them.

After this, we will attempt to define the concepts that are crucial to postmodern epistemology, and we will interact with and critique them.

Let us now turn to our first section.
(Continue Reading…)