As we have seen in the previous post, both Frankena and Medlin exploit what they perceive to be inconsistencies involved in the universalization of ethical egoism. Jesse Kalin has risen to the defense of the coherence of ethical egoism, but is he successful? It is to this question that we will now turn.

Analysis of Kalin’s Response
Recall that Frankena’s criticism centers on that fact that ethical egoism produces contradictory moral judgments when people’s self-interests collide. This is a result of the two parenetic principles that Frankena stipulates underlie ethical egoism:

(1)

(2)

When the interests of X and Z conflict, “X ought to do y” and “X ought not to do y” both follow when X and Z apply principles (1) and (2) in their capacity as either a first- or third-person moral agent.¹ Kalin agrees that (1) is central to any egoistic position, but he takes issues with (2) and he replaces principle (2) with principle (3) instead:

(3)

Unquestionably, this move allows Kalin to shield egoism from the charges that it produces contradictory moral judgments, but we must ask ourselves whether Kalin’s principle (3) is consistent with universal and categorical egoism.²

For our part, we do not believe that principle (3) is consistent with ethical egoism since it can never be in an egoist’s best interests to categorically endorse the actions of a third party, especially when those actions endanger his/her own interests.

Let’s say that ethical egoist Tom can assuredly get away with stealing from ethical egoist Fred. When Tom applies principle (1) he arrives at the judgment: “Tom ought to steal from Fred.” When Fred applies principle (3) as a third-party observer he arrives at the judgment: “Tom ought to steal from Fred.” So while Kalin’s move to redefine the parenetic principles underlying ethical egoism evidently removes the threat of contradictory moral judgments, it makes Fred look like a very strange egoist indeed, especially since he is endorsing action that is harmful to himself!

If Kalin argues that principle (3) is a necessary consequence of allowing the egoist the freedom to follow his own best interests, we follow Medlin in pointing out that Kalin has abandoned categorical egoism in favor of utilitarianism in egoistic dress.

In the final analysis then, we simply see no good justification for concluding that Kalin’s principle (3) is consistent with ethical egoism – in fact it seems that there are possible scenarios in which it would be quite antithetical to the overall spirit of egoism.

What about Kalin’s reply to Medlin though? Recall that Kalin answers Medlin by asserting that a person can agree with the propriety of an action without actually wanting that action to come about. Therefore, according to Kalin, while an egoist must approve of all egoistic actions, he is not committed to wanting them to come about (in fact, he may even work to actively prevent them from coming about).

Kalin’s analogy from the world of competitive sport is helpful and we can certainly grant that it seems quite possible for us to approve of our competitors trying their best to beat us while we actively hope that they will not. However, perhaps we can grant this because we are not, in fact, true egoists.³ The relevant question is not whether people in general can legitimately approve of the propriety of their competitor’s efforts to win while at the same time hoping they won’t, but whether egoists can adopt such a posture.

Can an egoist legitimately endorse the propriety of action that is to his/her own detriment? Returning to the sports analogy, what is one to make of cheaters, for example, those who “fix” the outcome of competitive games for personal gain? Do they sincerely believe that their opponents should try their hardest to win at all costs? They may profess their assent to such a proposition but their actions would seem to betray such sentiments as false. Is it possible that those who fix the outcome of competitive events are the ones who exemplify the true egoistic spirit?

Perhaps we can illustrate our point better by moving from the world of sports to a sphere with perhaps a bit more gravitas. Can an egoist really approve of the propriety of his neighbor trying to steal from him (provided he can get away with it), while hoping all along that he won’t? It hardly seems consistent with the spirit of egoism to grant any degree of approval to actions that are to one’s own disadvantage.

Therefore, in light of the broad definition of egoism that we began this analysis with (the perspective of maximizing one’s own good), we seriously question whether true egoists can really approve (in any meaningful sense) the propriety of actions that are to their own detriment.

Conclusion

As we implied in our introduction, ethical egoism may be saddled with internal structural difficulties that could render the question of its virtue and propriety irrelevant. Before one can ask the question of whether ethical egoism is a good or correct moral theory, we must first determine whether it is even internally coherent. Both Brian Medlin and William Frankena argue that the move from individual to universal egoism produces to a system of morality that necessarily entails inconsistent and conflicting moral guidance. Jesse Kalin has attempted to salvage ethical egoism with clever argumentation that seeks to deflect the criticism of both Frankena and Medlin. However, while Kalin’s responses do indeed shield ethical egoism from charges of internal inconsistency, they end up substantially altering egoism so that the resultant system doesn’t very well resemble egoism. In other words, many may have a difficult time identifying the position Kalin ultimately defends as true ethical egoism. We find it hard to understand how a true egoist can in any meaningful way ever endorse actions that run contrary to his/her own interests – and this is what Kalin’s defense necessarily entails. In the final analysis then, we do not believe that Kalin has successfully rescued ethical egoism from the charges that incoherence obtains once the move is made from individual to universal egoism. We conclude, together with Kant, that one cannot will the egoistic maxim to be a universal law, and hence ethical egoism proves itself to be internally incoherent after all.

1. For example, let’s say Tom could assuredly get away with stealing from Fred. When Tom applies principle (1), we end up with “Tom should steal from Fred.” When Fred (as a third-party in this situation) applies principle (2), we end up with “Tom should not steal from Fred.”↩
2. Unfortunately, Kalin doesn’t provide any explicit warrant for his assertion that his principle (3) is consistent with the spirit of ethical egoism, and so we must respond to presumed arguments he might make in this regard.↩
3. Kalin seems to assume the truthfulness of psychological egoism by appealing to the intuitive propriety of a competitor who approves of an opponent’s efforts to win while actively working against that end. Perhaps we are not, in fact, psychological egoists, which may explain why we can grant the propriety of our competitors trying to beat us while concurrently hoping that they will not. In other words, is it possible that a willingness to forego one’s own interests is an innate prerequisite of granting the propriety of Kalin’s analogy from competitive sports? Alternatively, perhaps we can grant his premise with regard to competitive sport because we have little emotional investment in the outcome. If we shift the analogy to something more weighty, we may hesitate to grant the propriety of actions that run contrary to our interests.↩