James W. Sire has recently made a contribution to the current thinking on worldview with his new book Naming the Elephant - Worldview as a Concept. Sire has grappled with the issues involved in worldview thinking for many years now. In fact, his book The Universe Next Door has gone through three editions up until 1997. With each edition he amended his own definition of worldview and refined the basic ingredients. The working definition of worldview at that time was the following:

“A worldview is a set of presuppositions (or assumptions) which we hold (consciously or subconsciously) about the basic makeup of our world.”¹

When David Naugle’s landmark study, Worldview: the History of a Concept came out in 2002, Sire sensed a need to go even further in refining his own definition. Naugle’s book provided the impetus for this latest book by Sire in which he offers four important revisions to his own definition of worldview:

“First is a recognition that a worldview is not just a set of basic concepts but a fundamental orientation of the heart. Second is an explicit insistence that at the deepest root of a worldview is its commitment to and understanding of the ‘really real.’ Third is a consideration of behavior in the determination of what one’s own or another’s worldview really is. Fourth is a broader understanding of how worldviews are grasped as story, not just as abstract propositions.”²

This revised definition includes the basic philosophical triad of metaphysics, epistemology and ethics and it clearly reflects an awareness of the postmodern challenges that have been made to modernistic definitions of worldview.

For Sire, the main questions that a worldview should answer are: “What is prime reality? Or, How can anyone know anything at all? That is, which is more primary - ontology or epistemology?”³

Following such basic questions, Sire surveys several worldview definitions, most prominently Naugle’s approach, and from that horizon he develops his own. One thing that Sire picks up on from Naugle’s definition is the primacy of ontology over epistemology. In fact, Sire dedicates an entire chapter (pp. 51-73) to this very question:

“What is the most foundational issue of all? Is it being or knowing or, perhaps, meaning?”⁴

I wish to begin by saying that there is much that we can appreciate in Sire’s book. I do have some issues, however, with the chapter on being and knowing just mentioned, which turns out to be a foundational chapter.

Rather than provide a full-scale book review I will summarize Sire’s thesis concerning the relationship between being and knowing and critique it from a more biblical, Reformed perspective. In what follows, I trust that I will have provided enough central citations from Sire so that even a reader who is relatively unacquainted with Sire’s book(s) will be able to [hopefully] follow the argument.

His Problem

Sire’s problem is that in some worldview approaches/philosophies (from Descartes straight through to postmodernism), epistemology has been assigned a primary role while ontology has been relegated to a secondary role. If we do not take ontology to be primary and treat it prior to epistemology, suggests Sire, we are bound for all kinds of trouble, such as Cartesian foundationalism or Rortian pragmatism

“we are basing our whole worldview on the fragile structure of the human ego, that is, on the autonomy of human reason, which really means the autonomy of each person’s human ego or each communities sense of reason. To do this is dangerous.”⁵

Today, he argues, even in Christian circles, “…the biblical priority of Being - God as Being - is replaced with epistemology or, more accurately, hermeneutics. The Christian worldview under these conditions becomes not just modern but postmodern.”⁵

Thus, according to Sire, the priority of ontology over epistemology is not only biblically required but also serves functionally as a countermeasure against relativism and postmodernism.

In the chapter entitled “First things first,” Sire claims: “Throughout the history of Western thought till the seventeenth century, the ontological question has been implicitly understood to be primary.”⁶ Furthermore, this hierarchical ordering of the philosophical branches has been closely bound up with orthodox Christian theology.

“Both traditional Jewish theism and traditional Christian theism have always seen the Infinite-Personal God as [sic] most basic form of what is. God, at the most fundamental level, is what it means to be. That is, they have put ontology before epistemology.”⁷

In fact, this is theologically essential. God comes first. “Epistemology is predicated on the nature of what is…”⁸ “Ontological priority even governs the evangel.”⁹

The gospel is not mainly about what he did or said, but who he is. According to Sire, “In the biblical worldview, in short, everything is first and foremost determined by the nature and character of God. It cannot be said too strongly: Ontology precedes epistemology.”¹⁰

Sire finally concludes the chapter in the following manner: “Let me simply say it again: Ontology precedes epistemology and hermeneutics - and whatever else there may be.”¹¹

Our problem

Now, again, there is much to agree with in Sire’s book. However, rather than dwell on these agreements, we must press on to the problems we see in Sire’s approach.

In terms of method, it is our opinion that Sire is not clear about the role of worldview thinking within the discipline of theology, which may simply be taken as a token of his overall lack of clarity about the relationship between philosophy and theology.

Sire assigns overlapping but different domains to worldview thinking and to theology - the former covers the domain of presuppositions and of the pre-theoretical, the latter the domain of the theoretic and dogmatic.¹²

While this may seem like a relatively small matter, we will see that his approach is governed far more by strictly philosophical commitments than by a desire to see strong theological commitments carried out consistently.

Univocal Predication

The main problem with Sire’s approach, as we see it, is that he uses the two most basic and important concepts of this discussion (being and knowledge) univocally (i.e. as essentially meaning the same for both man and God). Thus, he begins by asking about being:

“What is prime reality - the really real?”⁷

This prime reality he takes to be none other than the biblical God. “He is what it is to be.”¹³ Such a definition of being, however (which is reminiscent of Aquinas), is haunted by the analogia entis.

Whenever Sire speaks of Being, he uses it as an abstract, undifferentiated concept (which is understandable given his approach). He needs an abstract and univocal concept of Being as his “elephant” - the foundation upon which he constructs his epistemology.

In a recent interview about his book, Sire states:

“At the foundation of a person’s understanding of reality lies the Elephant that holds up their whole conception of life. The name each of us gives to that Elephant - God, the Cosmos, the Divine Fire, the Void - is the most important aspect of our worldview.”*¹⁴

In the final analysis, Sire asks: “So what is the nature of fundamental reality? What is Being? It is God in his awesome personal array of omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence and goodness.”⁹

This initially sounds like a self-conscious attempt to escape from a univocal notion of being. However, he does not go on to explain the relationship between God’s being and man’s being. In fact, man’s being is not discussed at all.

What are we left with then? Does man not have being? Or does he perhaps participate in God’s being (as per Aquinas)? Sire tells us that ontology precedes epistemology, indeed, it must he says. But must it really? And must it always (in every case), and for everyone? Could there not be a fundamental difference between God’s being and man’s being that we must take into account?

Parallel to his univocal construction of being, Sire also uses knowledge (knowing) in the same univocal manner, as if knowing were the same for God and man.

Creator/creature Distinction

It is here where we most clearly see Sire’s philosophical commitments at work which prevents him from applying theological categories and distinctions.

He initially begins with a kind of distinction between Creator and the creature. He talks about God being primary and first and not part of the cosmos (He is, rather, “in the beginning”). But where does he take this in terms of his worldview definition? Not very far, it seems.

In fact, the way in which he uses the notions of being and knowing reveal that the Creator/creature distinction does not have any real impact on the two most basic and substantial areas of any worldview: metaphysics (or ontology) and epistemology. We must hasten to add that if we neglect the Creator/creature distinction at this initial and critical stage, it is well justified that we ask what the worth of this distinction really is.

Note well that Sire cites approvingly from John Henry Newman who says: “All knowledge forms one whole, because its subject matter is one…”⁸ This is the Catholic/Medieval analogia entis pure and simple, which (while not otherwise friendly to evangelical theology) seems to repeatedly rear its ugly head in evangelical apologetic and philosophical discussions for some reason.

All of this betrays Sire’s monistic assumptions. For him, just like for Rome, reality is one and knowledge is one. In this schema, the difference between God’s being and man’s being (or God’s knowledge and man’s knowledge, respectively) can only be one of degree (it is not a difference in kind). In other words, they differ quantitatively, but not qualitatively. Certainly the difference is not significant enough to mention and work out in one’s metaphysic and epistemology. Therefore, in the final analysis, Sire is ultimately committed to a one-layer metaphysic and a concomitant one-layer epistemology.

Over and against that approach, we believe there is a need to be thoroughly biblical in this area. Therefore, it is absolutely incumbent upon us that we make a clear and consistent distinction between Creator and creature in both ontology and epistemology.

We argue, together with Van Til, that, “Christianity is committed for better or for worse to a two-layer theory of reality or being.”¹⁵ And this two-level ontology (that comes to expression in the Creator/creature distinction as a first order distinction) is uniquely biblical – over and against realist or idealist accounts. As Van Til states, “The doctrine of God’s being as qualitatively distinct from every other form of being is characteristic of Christianity alone. From the Christian point of view all other forms of metaphysical theory hold to a monistic assumption.”¹⁶

On that count, Sire’s proposal is at the least, sub-christian, and it will almost necessarily lead to a faulty epistemology as well. Van Til goes on to note:

“Any one attempting to make predication about Reality as a whole without first introducing the distinction between the self-contained God and created man is bound to admit sooner or later that he is confronted with ultimate mystery. . . . If all reality is not plainly divided into two parts at the outset of one’s predication, the one part being God himself, whose being is coterminous with his knowledge and whose knowledge is coterminous with his being; and the other part being the created universe, the nature of which is exhaustively determined by God’s plan or providence, then there is no escape from the idea of the mysterious as ultimate.”¹⁷

Archetype/Ectype Distinction

In order to avoid both extremes (i.e., ultimate mystery and univocation), we must here call to mind the Reformed distinction between God’s knowledge and man’s knowledge. This comes to expression in the important distinction between the archetype and the ectype (the former refers to God’s absolute, exhaustive, analytical self-knowledge & knowledge of everything outside of him, the latter refers to man’s derivative, limited, & analogical knowledge of himself and everything outside of himself, including God).

The archetype/ectype-distinction is the epistemological correlate of the Creature/creator-distinction and it provides the basis for the most basic metaphysical distinction. It seeks to do justice to the biblical teaching of God’s omniscience, which has always been understood (in the best strands of Reformed theology) to denote knowledge that is qualitatively different from man’s knowledge and not merely quantitatively different. God does not simply know infinitely more than man. He knows qualitatively differently. His knowledge is both absolutely extensive and intensive. His thoughts are not our thoughts.

“For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than your thoughts,” says the Lord (Isa. 55:9).

If we consistently apply the Creator/creature-distinction (as a first-order distinction) to our metaphysic, and the archetype/ectype-distinction (again as first-order distinction) to our epistemology, we will find a scheme that looks something like this:

First, we have the upper circle, the circle of God’s “reality.” There is the metaphysical archetype, which is God, the self-contained ontological Trinity (Trinity ad intra). We refer to it as aM (for “archetypal Metaphysics”).

There is also the epistemological archetype, which is God’s analytical and exhaustive knowledge. We refer to it as aE (for “archetypal Epistemology”).

Then, we have the lower circle, the circle of man’s reality. Here we have an “ectypal metaphysics” (eM), which is man’s constitution as a creature of God.
We also have an “ectypal epistemology” (eE), which is man’s knowledge of himself, God and the world.

These distinctions (even if expressed in philosophical language) seem to us to be absolutely necessary and basic if one is to put God and man on the same map in terms of both knowledge and being. Otherwise, monism, emanationanism, mysticism, rationalism, and pantheism are only a few of the possible alternatives and dangers that result.

“First things first”

Finally, let us say something about priority. As we have seen, Sire argues arduously for the priority of ontology over epistemology. Recall his words, “Does the sequence of questions make a difference? The quick answer is yes - a profound difference.”¹⁸

He fears all sorts of dangers if we invert this order. Now, for our part, we do not intend to turn it around. Rather, we want to question whether the order really is all that important after all.

From what we have said so far, it seems clear that what is most important is the basic biblical distinction between God and man (both in the concept of being and knowing). Once these distinctions are in place, we cannot even properly ask the question Sire asks, “What comes first, epistemology or ontology?” For we must reply: “For whom? Man or God?”

We confess (together with reformed orthodoxy) God’s aseity as his metaphysical independence (vis-à-vis priority and originality). We must also confess that in God essence and existence are coterminous, as are knowing and being. God’s self-knowledge and being are both eternally and equally ultimate.

Thus, interestingly, in God there is no priority at all. On the archetypal level there is, of course, a kind of circularity or reciprocity between ontology and epistemology. And this is not problematic at all. There is no danger of relativism or mysticism or any other such -ism that Sire might fear.

What about on the ectypal, human level? On this level, it seems to us that there is no real reason to think it should be any different. Certainly we acknowledge that man’s being is derived and not ultimate, and so is his knowledge. Both depend upon God as their archetype. Recalling the opening material of Calvin’s Institutes, we are reminded that no sooner can we look inside our own metaphysical constitution than we know something true about ourselves and about God. The former and the latter are involved in one another, which is to say that they are reciprocally related.

Of course, we have to keep in mind that the being of God (aM) is ontologically prior to our being (eM) and that the knowledge of God (aE) is epistemologically prior to our knowledge (eE). But that is merely to restate the Creator/creature-distinction we defined as basic and inviolable earlier.

In fact, it seems that any hard and fast separation between epistemology and metaphysics must be regarded as nothing other than post-Kantian residue. In a theistic universe, there cannot be an absolute antithesis between being and knowing. We must not forget that the knowability of the universe, for example, is an ontological quality it possesses.

We see here then that epistemology is grounded in a metaphysical state of affairs. But the reverse holds true as well. Since all of creation is purposely revelatory of God, metaphysics is grounded in an epistemological state of affairs. If God exists (i.e. has being), he has to be known (primarily and absolutely) by God himself. The same holds true for the world. Anything that exists must be known. And what is truly known exists. Absolute “unknownness” is, therefore, absolute nonexistence.

Cornelius Van Til puts epistemology and metaphysics in a reciprocal relationship to each other. He says,

“Our theory of knowledge is what it is because our theory of being is what it is. As Christians we cannot begin speculating about knowledge by itself. We cannot ask how we know without at the same time asking what we know. We quote again from Christian Apologetics. We have felt ourselves compelled to take our notions with respect to the nature of reality from the Bible. It will readily be conceded that such a notion of reality as we have presented could be received upon authority only. Such a notion of being as we have presented is to be found nowhere except in the Bible. The Bible is taken so seriously that we have not even left any area of known reality by which the revelation that comes to us in the Bible may be compared, or to which it may be referred as to a standard. We have taken the final standard of truth to be the Bible itself. It is needless to say that this procedure will appear suicidal to most men who study philosophy. Is it not by the help of man’s own reason that we are to think out the nature of reality and knowledge? To accept an interpretation of life upon authority is permissible only if we have looked into the foundations of the authority we accept. But if we must determine the foundations of the authority, we no longer accept authority on authority. Authority could be authority to us only if we already knew that it had the right to claim authority. Such could be the case only if we knew in advance the nature of that authority. Thus we would have a theory of being already taken for granted at the outset of our investigation. In this manner we could not give a fair hearing to opposing views.”¹⁹

Principia Theologiae

We must be committed to the Reformed orthodox emphasis on the two principles of theology - the principle of being (principium essendi or Seinsprinzip), and the principle of knowing (principium cognoscendi or Erkenntnisprinzip).

God is the principle of being. His being is original, all other being is derivative via creation.

God’s revealed truth is the principle of knowing. His knowledge is original, all other knowledge is derivative via revelation.

On the level of the principia it is perfectly clear that there is no priority or order between ontology and epistemology because there is no such order in God. In contrast, with Sire we run into real problems at this point. He says, “A Christian is first of all one who affirms the existence of an infinite-personal God, not one who takes the Bible as a revelation of God.”²⁰

This is a false and dangerous dichotomy that results from prior philosophical commitments. How can a Christian affirm the metaphysical truth of the existence of a God without taking simultaneously and immediately the other principle into account (revelation)? An absolute God and an absolute Bible go hand in hand. As Van Til states:

“In the Christian doctrine of the self-contained ontological Trinity we have the foundation concept of a Christian theory of being, of knowledge and of action.”²¹

Conclusion

What can we say by way of conclusion? James Sire surely traffics in strictly philosophical categories (which turn out to be antithetical to Christian categories of thought) rather than truly biblical ones. Though he does lip service to the Creator/creature-distinction, it has virtually no impact on his notion of being and knowledge. In his schema, both are univocally conceived and discussed.

Since we want to be explicitly biblical in our approach to worldview thinking, we must reject even this new approach of Sire’s (together with his revised definition of worldview). No doubt his latest work is surely bound to elicit additional critique from certain postmodern quarters of the theological community. But it should also elicit critique from consistently Christian philosophers and theologians.

Our final judgment is that while Sire may have tried to baptize the elephant, it seems as if he has the wrong animal altogether.

1. James W. Sire, The Universe Next Door Intervarsity Press, 1988), 17.↩
2. James W. Sire, Naming the Elephant: Worldview As a Concept (Grand Rapids: InterVarsity Press, 2004), 13.↩
3. Ibid., 21.↩
4. Ibid., 50.↩
5. Ibid., 72-73.↩
6. Ibid., 51.↩
7. Ibid., 52.↩
8. Ibid., 55.↩
9. Ibid., 57.↩
10. Ibid., 56.↩
11. Ibid., 73.↩
12. Cf. Ibid., 70.↩
13. Ibid., 53.↩
14. http://www.ivpress.com/title/int/2779.php↩
15. Ibid., 30-31. Please note that this cannot properly be considered dualistic because the two layers (or levels of being) are not to be set in opposition to each other, but rather they are causally and organically related.↩
16. Ibid., 30-31.↩
17. Van Til, Introduction to Systematic Theology, 117.↩
18. Sire, Naming the Elephant, 52.↩
19. Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 32.↩
20. Sire, Naming the Elephant, 58 n.8.↩
21. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 39.↩