Comments on: PostModern Epistemology (II) - Modern Precursors: Kant http://blog.solagratia.org/2005/12/09/postmodern-epistemology-ii-modern-precursors-kant/ Dealing with issues in reformed theology. Wed, 07 Jan 2009 03:02:43 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.6 By: Patrick McCarty http://blog.solagratia.org/2005/12/09/postmodern-epistemology-ii-modern-precursors-kant/#comment-81 Patrick McCarty Thu, 15 Dec 2005 10:42:06 +0000 http://blog.solagratia.org/?p=46#comment-81 You wrote a very succinct and readable overview of central Kantian themes. I have only two points to add, in the interest of engagement. You write, "And epistemoligically, it seems to me, Kant was not able to provide a 'bridge' between the noumena and phenomena, simply because the former are by definition 'unknowable.'" It was Kant's view that the Glaube (belief) produced by a disclosing of pure practical reason was more powerful than mere knowledge. Without at all abandoning the unknowability of things-in-themselves, he demonstrates the necessary rational structure of freedom, and this practical structure (resulting in Glaube) commands a greater assent than knowledge, Kant says. I wanted to say something, too, about your first post. Kant would spin in his grave if he thought his legacy [was] the reduction of reading to "the reader's internal psychology." In fact, I don't think that would be the view of Derrida, for instance, at all. Derrida was very conscious of "conditions of readability" and of the role of rules in reading. This understanding of "rules," however, is not at all like that which Kant sets down in "Introduction to Logic." Kant, very interestingly, calls these rules "a universal grammar" of sorts. Yes, for Kant reason is fixed in its purity, self-organizing, necessary and universal. This, obviously, would not be the Derridean view. However, once again, while Derrida is doing intertextual readings (like Bloom in this ONE regard), it does not come down to caprice or the randonness of individual psychologies at all. One can, regardless, see the thesis that is being developed in the book you describe, and there is certainly truth in it, in my view. I would be tempted to throw Heidegger into the mix, and not only his own peculiar musings but his immensely readable and enjoyable book on Kant. I enjoyed your very lucid posts extremely. Patrick You wrote a very succinct and readable overview of central Kantian themes. I have only two points to add, in the interest of engagement. You write, “And epistemoligically, it seems to me, Kant was not able to provide a ‘bridge’ between the noumena and phenomena, simply because the former are by definition ‘unknowable.’” It was Kant’s view that the Glaube (belief) produced by a disclosing of pure practical reason was more powerful than mere knowledge. Without at all abandoning the unknowability of things-in-themselves, he demonstrates the necessary rational structure of freedom, and this practical structure (resulting in Glaube) commands a greater assent than knowledge, Kant says. I wanted to say something, too, about your first post. Kant would spin in his grave if he thought his legacy [was] the reduction of reading to “the reader’s internal psychology.” In fact, I don’t think that would be the view of Derrida, for instance, at all. Derrida was very conscious of “conditions of readability” and of the role of rules in reading. This understanding of “rules,” however, is not at all like that which Kant sets down in “Introduction to Logic.” Kant, very interestingly, calls these rules “a universal grammar” of sorts. Yes, for Kant reason is fixed in its purity, self-organizing, necessary and universal. This, obviously, would not be the Derridean view. However, once again, while Derrida is doing intertextual readings (like Bloom in this ONE regard), it does not come down to caprice or the randonness of individual psychologies at all. One can, regardless, see the thesis that is being developed in the book you describe, and there is certainly truth in it, in my view. I would be tempted to throw Heidegger into the mix, and not only his own peculiar musings but his immensely readable and enjoyable book on Kant. I enjoyed your very lucid posts extremely. Patrick

]]> By: Sebastian Heck http://blog.solagratia.org/2005/12/09/postmodern-epistemology-ii-modern-precursors-kant/#comment-70 Sebastian Heck Mon, 12 Dec 2005 04:28:04 +0000 http://blog.solagratia.org/?p=46#comment-70 Thanks for clarifying that and adding an important point. I am aware that I am not giving the "full context" of Kant. The function of "practical reason" in Kant's thought is indeed a very important bridge between the noumena and the phenomena. However, I tried to concentrate on the epistemological issues involved in Kant which are important "forerunners" of Postmodern thought. And epistemologically, it seems to me, Kant was not able to provide a "bridge" between the noumena and phenomena, simply because the former are by definition "unknowable." Thanks for clarifying that and adding an important point. I am aware that I am not giving the “full context” of Kant. The function of “practical reason” in Kant’s thought is indeed a very important bridge between the noumena and the phenomena. However, I tried to concentrate on the epistemological issues involved in Kant which are important “forerunners” of Postmodern thought. And epistemologically, it seems to me, Kant was not able to provide a “bridge” between the noumena and phenomena, simply because the former are by definition “unknowable.”

]]> By: T.B. Vick http://blog.solagratia.org/2005/12/09/postmodern-epistemology-ii-modern-precursors-kant/#comment-69 T.B. Vick Mon, 12 Dec 2005 04:10:25 +0000 http://blog.solagratia.org/?p=46#comment-69 Sebastian Heck declares: "Since the categories of the mind only apply to the phenomenal realm of time and space, we are therefore “forever excluded from knowledge of noumena,"5 - God, self, and the Ding an sich.6 For all that we know, these things might have an independent nature of their own, but we simply cannot call this “knowledge” in the proper sense. Hence, the noumena have only regulative value as limiting concepts." The above is not the full context of Kant. In Kant's work "The Critique of Practical Reason," Kant actually bridges the gap between the noumena and the phenomena through the moral and the practical. The above is a neo-Kantian view of Kant, which is more akin to David Hume than to Kant. Hume draws a stronger dichotomy between the noumena and phenomena, Kant details his overall philosophy that this 'gap' is crossed through the moral (categorical imperative) and the practical. Sebastian Heck declares:

“Since the categories of the mind only apply to the phenomenal realm of time and space, we are therefore “forever excluded from knowledge of noumena,”5 - God, self, and the Ding an sich.6 For all that we know, these things might have an independent nature of their own, but we simply cannot call this “knowledge” in the proper sense. Hence, the noumena have only regulative value as limiting concepts.”

The above is not the full context of Kant. In Kant’s work “The Critique of Practical Reason,” Kant actually bridges the gap between the noumena and the phenomena through the moral and the practical.

The above is a neo-Kantian view of Kant, which is more akin to David Hume than to Kant. Hume draws a stronger dichotomy between the noumena and phenomena, Kant details his overall philosophy that this ‘gap’ is crossed through the moral (categorical imperative) and the practical.

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