On the Shoulders of Giants (VIII)
Some Personal Observations
At this point in the series, We would like to reflect on some of the issues that have been raised in our survey of Van Til’s critical appropriation of Benjamin B. Warfield and Abraham Kuyper.
First let us consider Warfield.
We have attempted to be consistent in describing Warfield’s apologetic method as “classical.†In other words, Warfield follows the two-stage method in which he first deals with questions concerning the existence of a generic deity along with the possibility of communication between this god and man (and also with the nature of man’s ability to receive divine communication) - and all of this is done within a philosophical context apparently divorced from any Scriptural considerations. Then, and after laying this groundwork, Warfield looks at the historical evidence of Holy Scripture to see if it is, in fact, such a divine communication as he proves to be merely possible in the first stage of the method.
With all due respect for Warfield, he too easily confuses natural theology with natural revelation.1 Natural theology (when conducted in the abstract and apart from special revelation) will inevitably be skewed by the sinful mind of the unregenerate person who considers/formulates/codifies it. In other words, We can’t help but observe that Warfield seems to have attributed objectivity, intelligibility, and clarity (attributes which properly belong to natural revelation) to natural theology.
This is not to reject natural theology outright. It is merely to recognize the difference between God’s revelation as such and man’s possibly fallible and sinful interpretation of it. Certainly, we can’t imagine Warfield confusing the Bible with an interpretation of it. Even the Westminster Standards, which are arguably the most faithful exposition of Scripture in confessional and catechetical form, are not infallible. We are able to recognize and affirm the difference between the Bible and a derivative theology that arises from it.2
Ultimately, our concern at this point is simply to note that both parts of Warfield’s classical method seem to be saddled with serious problems. Not only are there problems with Warfield’s approach to the first part of his classical apologetical method, but problems burden his approach to “evidence” as well. Van Til accuses Warfield of operating with an abstract notion of probability.3
What does he mean by this? I think it has to do with Warfield’s notion of induction. It is generally recognized in logic textbooks that deductive logic yields certainty while inductive logic can only yield probability. In our opinion, Warfield moves from a defective use of natural theology to a defective understanding of induction.
If the process of induction is abstracted from the God-given covenantal context in which God intends for it to be properly utilized, it can only ever yield probabilities since the very nature of induction is to form generalizations based upon the examination of evidence. Conclusions, therefore (and by the very nature of the case), can only be tentative. There is always the possibility that another piece of evidence will turn up that overturns or calls into question a previously formulated theory or generalization. And the unbiblical notions of possibility and probability are, of course, unconstrained by biblical realities.
However, given the reality of the God of the Scriptures, we are not concerned that another piece of evidence will turn up to reveal a world best described as totally naturalistic. No evidence will arise that demonstrates that Jesus wasn’t raised from the dead. Warfield apparently did not recognize that he was operating with a notion of induction and possibility that denied at the outset what he was endeavoring to prove.
And what about Scripture’s own nature as self-authenticating? As we have already noted, both stages of Warfield’s classical apologetic (what Van Til has called the “block-house†method) fail to live up to biblical standards for apologetic argumentation.
Before we turn to consider Abraham Kuyper, there is one final matter to consider regarding Warfield’s apologetic. It has to do with his recurring reference to “pure reason†or “right reason.â€
What exactly does Warfield mean by these expressions? Van Til recognizes some opaqueness to the terms but finally decides that they reflect a belief in a “neutral” reason. Now, if Warfield means nothing more than the notion that reason as originally created would recognize the revelation God has implanted in nature and history, this would not be a problem. Further, if Warfield wants to affirm that the fall has not totally obliterated reason, we would gladly grant him this point. But what exactly are the nature and extent of the noetic effects of sin?
As we mentioned in an earlier note, when Warfield discusses the nature of science, he tends to stress the incomplete nature of unbelieving science but he also appears to slight the reality of the active rebellion of the human heart. If Warfield is arguing that regenerate or restored reason would readily recognize both natural and special revelation, fine. There is, we think, room here for discussion.
Paul Helseth has argued in several recent papers that the Old Princeton theologians were not the bald rationalists that they have often been made out to be.4 He has written on Hodge, Warfield, and Machen, and he makes the argument that all of these men had an understanding of the soul; or human personality as an integrated whole so that “right reason†must be regenerate reason.
Helseth has pointed to the article “Authority, Intellect, Heart†by Warfield to prove his point.5 Even if he is correct in this reassessment of Warfield, what do we do with Warfield’s use of the classical approach to apologetics? If Warfield understands “right reason” to be regenerate reason, it makes his apologetic method all the more enigmatic, not less so. It may be that Warfield’s inconsistency is more complex than previously thought. Clearly there is room for further research here.
End Notes
1. Van Til, Christian Theory, 231.
2. I am not suggesting that theology or doctrinal formulations can’t accurately reflect the teaching of the Bible. Indeed I think they can and do. We are able to discern more and less biblical systems of doctrine by comparison of them with Scripture itself. The fact that it is a comparison means that they are not one and the same thing. Additionally, granting the potential of human fallibility generally does not prove an error in any particular instance.
3. Van Til, Defense, 265.
4. See the sources noted in note 3 of post IV.
5. Warfield, Writings, 2: 668-671. Cited by Helseth in his “Warfield’s Appeal,†156-177.
Once again, very helpful. I agree with your concluding statements, it becomes more ironic if he is reassesed as referring to a regenerate person. The whole article was informative.
Comment on March 13, 2006 @ 8:30 pm
Thank you for your encouraging words!
I am more inclined with the latest work being done on the nature of “right reason” that it is, in fact, regenerate reason. This just means we need to make sure we have an accurate understanding of how certain words or expressions are being used before we criticize their use. This entails the slow, methodical research of the history of the use of an idea or expression because we can’t assume that we automatically understand how some word or expression is being used.
In the series I have cited the work of Paul Helseth. He has done and is doing the lion’s share of the research on this question from the perspective of interest in Old Princeton and the Reformed heritage as a whole. It will repay you hefty dividends should you hunt down his various articles and work through them. I would like to see Paul do a book-legnth treatment of the subject some day (hint, hint!).
Comment on March 14, 2006 @ 1:34 pm
Why would the problem of the unregenerate mind not also apply to Van Til’s own apologetic approach? Does his approach somehow bypass or overcome the problem of the the noetic effects of the fall? It seems to me that if this objection applies to classical apologetics use with unbelievers it also applies to all apologetics with any unbeliever. In other words, Van Til’s apologetics will not work with unbelievers either, because they are not regenerate. You must be consistent and apply this to him, as well.
Secondly, the objection that these arguments are useless with the unregenerate person seems to be a misuse of the doctrine, because at any one moment, with any particular unbeliever, we cannot rule out the possibility that the Holy Spirit is at that moment opening the eyes of that person and regenerating them. Being regenerated is an invisible work, a secret work of God, that we are not privy to. It is a misuse of this principle to try to apply it in a particular situation as if you can guarantee that God cannot be working at that moment. I would much rather assume the opposite: that in response to my prayers for this unbeliever, God is answering and working in that person’s heart, secretly, and using my words and actions to communicate truth to him.
So I consider these objections to be false and selectively applied.
You are left only with the argument that it is unbiblical to use induction or any argument that produces less than perfect certainty. Here are my questions:
1. Is certainty a property of an argument or a state of mind? Are you failing to distinguish between a)logical proof that is impervious to any objections, and b) convincing someone of the truth of a proposition? What I mean is, isn’t there a difference between logical proof and moral/psychological certainty? The reality is that people are persuaded by all kinds of different evidence and arguments, because they are individuals. People can come to a state of moral and psychological certainty by inductive evidence. We do it all the time. In addition, this kind of moral certainty could be what we call biblical faith, which is a gift of the Holy Spirit, and He is free to confer that any way He pleases. Are you trying to say the Holy Spirit is unable to confer faith upon someone unless they use a transcendental argument?
2. If inductive arguments are so unbiblical, why does the Bible itself use them so frequently? How do you support your claim that inductive arguments and evidence are unbiblical and wrong?
Regarding your argument that Warfield was wrong to give external reasons to support that the Bible is what it claims to be - a revelation from the God who truly exists - it is not sound. To say that the Bible is self-authenticating does not rule out the possibility that God also made it to correspond to and with His other revelation, His works. In other words, it could be both self-authenticating and also authenticated by God’s other revelation: His works. In fact, the Bible is unique in the fact that it is not *only* self-authenticating, but connects with general revelation in a multitude of ways that are open to all people to examine. It is the one religious book that gives plenty of information that is testable by external evidence, and also has not been disproved by the test of external evidence (as has, for instance, the book of Mormon). Why do you assume that general revelation ought never to be used as corroboration for the Bible?
I also have a problem with your claim that Warfield was failing to make a distinction between natural revelation and natural theology. It seems you are once again being selective in applying an objection to him but not to Van Til. This same problem applies to to Scriptural data. Van Til’s own interpretation of what is biblical, his own theories of what arguments are valid and biblical are not infallible just because he claims that he is getting them from the Bible rather than general revelation. He does not get an exemption from having to prove that what he claims is true just because he uses verbal revelation instead of general revelation. The reality is that it may be easy in theory to separate the source of truth from our understanding of that truth, but in practice it is very, very difficult to distinguish it. Even Christians have blind spots, are subject to arrogant bias, are limited creatures that do not take in all the biblical evidence with complete impartiality, and need the corrective of other Christians, and even of general revelation in order to interpret Scripture correctly.
You insert in this argument also the idea that it is unregenerate people reading the general revelation, but that is not so. It is the apologist (Warfield) that is reading the general revelation and directing the mind and discussion with the unbeliever, so that objection cannot apply.
Secondly, if you are going to insist upon the idea that general revelation **inevitably** is distorted by the unregenerate mind, it seems that you are implying that the God’s general revelation is actually *ineffective* with unbelievers, and only effective with believers, which is the same thing as saying that general revelation is not general (available to all), but special (limited). To say it *is* a revelation when it is not actually effective in giving true knowledge to unbelievers is to render it *not* revelation, but a hiding of truth.
So my question is, do you, or do you not believe that unregenerate man has true knowledge, as per Romans 1? Either he does or he doesn’t. Is the problem of the unregenerate an inability to see truth at all, or an unwillingness to bow to the truth he does know, because of a sinful nature enslaved to sin? Please give a clear answer on this and don’t keep changing the story as it suits you, as I notice many presuppositionalists do. Please be consistent, applying the same rules to presuppositionalists that you apply to other apologists. Either you are arguing that it is impossible for the unregenerate to ever believe anything but falsehoods, impossible for them to come to any true conclusions from general revelation, or you will admit that it is at times possible for them to do so (not infallibly, not in every case, not all the time, but at least some of the time - which is also true of believers, by the way, unless you are going to argue that believers are infallible!).
What it seems to me you are doing is using arguments against Warfield’s approach that do not prove what you are claiming, and if they did prove it, they would equally apply to Van Til’s apologetics. The fact that unbelievers are by definition unregenerate applies to all apologetics, the fact that unbelievers suppress the truth they know applies to arguments based upon both the Word and works of God, the fact that the apologist himself is fallible applies to both, the fact that the arguments can be rejected applies to both, and the fact that apart from the work of the Holy Spirit none of the arguments will be effective applies to both. Either you apply them to both (which would mean that you argue for fideism) or you must drop them.
Comment on April 7, 2007 @ 9:49 am
First let me say that I apologize for getting your theological shorts all in knots.
Secondly I am a fond admirer of Warfield as I am of Van Til and other theologians and apologists. But on the issue of apologetical method I side with Van Til. This does not mean that I take issue with everything Warfield ever wrote or even everything he ever wrote about apologetics.
I would love to respond to each and every contention in your comment, but frankly I don’t recognize myself in your remarks. And I honestly think you attribute views to me that I do not adhere to. And I happen to think you don’t understand Warfield well either.
Comment on April 12, 2007 @ 8:24 am