As presuppositionalists, we should constantly seek to expose autonomous reasoning and argumentation. I recently listened to an interesting unveiling of autonomous thought on a Mars Hill audio journal. The speaker was talking about the various pro-life arguments and demonstrated how pro-life apologists typically appeal to autonomy. Often, the pro-life argument is presented as such:

We need to stand up for the unborn child because they don’t have a voice of their own. We must protect them because no one asked them about taking their life.

This reasoning fails within a proper Christian epistemology. Consider the context of euthanasia, in which the “patient” desires to be killed (assisted suicide). The patient has a voice and is saying they want to die. The common pro-life apologetic must permit it. The sanctity of life has therefore not been maintained.

As Christians, we must always seek to be transformed by the renewing of our minds. This includes not only what we think, but how we think. If we employ autonomous reasoning as opposed to a proper analogical epistemology founded on the knowledge of God that has been revealed to us, we have already failed. It behooves us to seek to sanctify our reasoning in order to provide a God-honoring apologetic.

In his unpublished Reformed Textual Criticism,¹ Moises Silva brings up an interesting point regarding the Van Tilian aversion to probabilistic methods and the discipline of textual criticism. One need not spend much time in order to uncover Van Til’s negativity toward probabilistic methods. He found no room for probability within the Christian epistemology. This leads the textual critic who has Van Tilian sympathies to question whether he needs to jettison one of his interests. The whole enterprise of textual criticism is based on mechanical methods designed to point out which textual variant is most likely original.

Silva assuages the apparent clash:

It would be misleading, I think, to suggest that Van Til disapproved of using the methods of probability in every respect. We may be quite sure that even he, upon hearing a weather forecast predicting a 90% probability of showers, would have canceled a Saturday picnic. […] What provoked Van Til, of course, was Bishop Butler’s transference of such day-by-day decisions to matters about which the Bible speaks unequivocally, including especially the existence of God (also such affirmations as the resurrection of Jesus Christ and the divine authority of the Scriptures). Many other things, however, do no belong in the same category. Even some matters having to do with our Christian life lack firm certainty.²

He then adds in a footnote:

Even more fundamentally, Van Til objected to the use of possibility and probability arguments when presenting the gospel to unbelievers, on account of conflicting epistemologies: “For the natural man the idea of possibility is on the one hand identical with chance and on the other hand with that which the natural man himself can rationalize. For him only that is practically possible which man can himself order by his logical faculties. But the word possibility means for the Christan that which may happen in accord with the plan of God” (The Defense of the Faith [3d ed.; Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1967] 144).³

Silva studied under Van Til in the late 1960s and to his knowledge, Van Til never brought up textual criticism “even during his most vigorous denunciations of ‘probabilistic apologetics.’”⁴

1. Silva, Moises. Reformed Textual Criticism (Philadelphia: Westminster Theological Seminary, 1990).↩
2. Ibid., 20.↩
3. Ibid.↩
4. Ibid., 19.↩

Although the postmodern constituency would have us do away with the modern world view, Western civilization still has the characteristics of modernity. Brian J. Walsh and J. Richard Middleton argue for the case that Western civilization serves three dominant idols which serve to make sense of modernity by orienting the dominant culture around a common set of goals. The three idols, or gods of our age, Walsh and Middleton propose are 1) scientism 2) technicism, and 3) economism.

Scientism

Scientism is the ability to understand and control nature. The modern world view believes human reason, especially operating within the scientific method, can achieve exhaustive knowledge. It is very much a faith in science as a tool of autonomous reason over against faith in a sovereign God. As Francis Bacon said “knowledge is power.”

…from the beginning of the modern era until today, the conscious purpose of science has been the utilitarian manipulation of the world-machine for human ends. By continuously applying science, the modern creed confesses, we progress steadily toward an earthly utopia, a millennial age of our own making.¹

Technicism

Technicism very much builds upon the foundation scientism creates. Technicism is the “formative, technological mastery of nature… It translates scientific discovery into human power.”² This idol is very much present in our society. In fact, we label other countries according to their level of technological advancement (i.e. “third world”, etc.). Technicism marks a shift from the hope of technological advancement to a belief in its inevitability. Progress is guaranteed and autonomous reason operates through scientism to produce technology used to master our environment.

While scientism holds out the promise of omniscience, technicism offers us omnipotence. Modern humanity has come to believe in the unlimited (and thus unnormed) advance of science and technology, regardless of the consequences - social, environmental or psychological. We have come to believe that if it can be known, it must be known; and if it can be made, it must be made.³

Economism

The third god of this age proposed by Walsh and Middleton is economism. Simply put, economism is the use of technology for profit maximization. To the corporation, the stock price is never high enough. There is no level that is satisfactory. It is an unending quest for wealth that never satisfies.

We believe in the promise of the golden god, and it has driven us to servile devotion because its promise is greatest of all. While scientism offered omniscience and technicism provided omnipotence, the god of economism (the absolutization of mankind’s good ability to make economic choices) extends to all who listen the breathtaking promise of full and glorious material prosperity - nothing short of secular salvation. “Consume and see that this god is good.”⁴

1. Walsh, Brian J. and J. Richard Middleton, The Transforming Vision: Shaping a Christian World View (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1984), 133.↩
2. Ibid., 133.↩
3. Ibid., 135. Emphasis original.↩
4. Ibid., 138. Emphasis original.↩

The following is a brief list of books on apologetics in the tradition of Van Til. These are the books I have found to be most helpful in developing a presuppositional apologetic. These books aren’t necessarily an easy read, but for those seeking understanding in the subject, these are the writings I have found most helpful.

• Bahnsen, Greg L. Van Til’s Apologetic (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1998).
  This book is indispensable. I would recommend reading this book before all the other books (provided one if fairly familiar with presuppositionalism). Bahnsen provides tremendously useful footnotes that explain Van Til’s writing. Diving right into Van Til’s writings directly can be a bit overwhelming. Bahnsen provides an alternative that lets you get into the depths of Van Til while he still holds your hand so you don’t drown. The book is laid out in a way that lends itself to referencing - so you’ll be able to turn to appropriate sections easily when you’re looking for a particular topic.  Bahnsen is perhaps the author closest [very close] to Van Til’s position. John Frame strays just a little bit in a few areas (Bahnsen addresses these in the book). For those seeking a thorough explanation of presuppositional apologetics - this is the book.
• Frame, John. Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1995).
  This is another great overview of Van Til’s apologetic. Though the title may indicate otherwise, it is a sympathetic work. I found the discussion of the problem of the one-and-many to be very helpful.
• Notaro, Thom. Van Til and the Use of Evidence (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1980).
  This small volume covers the much debated topic of presuppositional apologetics and evidences. It’s a useful book and provides a good overview of how the presuppositionalist [should] understand the role of evidences.
• Van Til, Cornelius and William Edgar, ed. Christian Apologetics (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 2003).
  This book is perhaps the closest thing to an introduction to apologetics Van Til wrote. Bill Edgar annotates some of the more difficult sections. It’s a wonderful book, however it’s not necessary if you have read Bahnsen’s volume.
• Van Til, Cornelius. The Defense of the Faith (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1955).
  This is the classic Van Til volume. If you only have one Van Til book on the shelf, this should be it. However, much of this book is contained in Bahnsen’s book. If you’ve read Bahnsen you’ll have already read the big points and heard the famous illustrations.
• Pratt, Richard L. Every Thought Captive. (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1979).
  This short book is an introduction to presuppositional apologetics aimed at high school students. It’s a great book and provides a Biblical foundation for apologetics. It is an introduction, so if you’re familiar with the subject, it is non-essential. This book is a great resource to point others toward.

There are many other great books, but these few will give you a solid foundation in presuppositional thought. Perhaps we could get Presbyterian and Reformed Publishers to package these together and offer them at a discount.

Current discussion on the nature and substance of covenant theology has centered around biblico-theological as well as systematico-theological questions. While these discussions will have some bearing upon the subject of this paper, I want to focus mainly on the philosophical and apologetical ramifications of the concept of covenant. More narrowly, I want to investigate into the relationship between the concept of the covenant and epistemology. I will argue that the theological concept of the covenant can provide some needed solutions to epistemological impasses in philosophy. If man is in everything everywhere and always “coram deo” and epistemology is at bottom covenantally construed, this will have consequences for our apologetics. The results of the best of Reformed covenant theology, both biblico-theologically and systematico-theologically, will then feed into a uniquely biblical epistemology which will, in turn, ground a powerful apologetic for our times and issue a covenantal call to repentance. (Continue Reading…)

At this point in our series we will turn to Abraham Kuyper. We should hasten to add that we must dismiss the suggestion that Van Til totally rejects Warfield and wholly accepts Kuyper.

Not so. We happen to believe that Kuyper is correct in recognizing that the antithesis between belief and unbelief is absolute in principle. However, he apparently failed to understand how this antithesis works itself out in history.

We have already noted that Kuyper works with what might best be labeled a territorial view of the belief/unbelief antithesis and common grace. I suspect this sets up a see-saw relationship between the two so that Kuyper must account for what looks to him like areas of neutrality or practices which are not affected by the fall. As in a war, there are zones of neutrality where enemies can meet on equal terms and come together to forge common notions of peace.

Needless to say, we believe that Van Til’s temporal or historical (could we not say “eschatological”?) understanding of both the belief/unbelief antithesis and common grace are an improvement.¹
(Continue Reading…)

Some Personal Observations

At this point in the series, We would like to reflect on some of the issues that have been raised in our survey of Van Til’s critical appropriation of Benjamin B. Warfield and Abraham Kuyper.

First let us consider Warfield.

We have attempted to be consistent in describing Warfield’s apologetic method as “classical.” In other words, Warfield follows the two-stage method in which he first deals with questions concerning the existence of a generic deity along with the possibility of communication between this god and man (and also with the nature of man’s ability to receive divine communication) - and all of this is done within a philosophical context apparently divorced from any Scriptural considerations. Then, and after laying this groundwork, Warfield looks at the historical evidence of Holy Scripture to see if it is, in fact, such a divine communication as he proves to be merely possible in the first stage of the method.
(Continue Reading…)

Warfield, as we have already noted, is very critical of this placement. Warfield understands apologetics to be the discipline that precedes the other theological tasks and which clears and prepares the ground for exegesis, historical theology, systematics, and practical theology.

Warfield calls theology done along the lines of this model a “grand assumption” without an apologetic that precedes the enterprise. In other words, how do we know that what we are saying bears any relationship to the truth? As far as I can tell, Warfield and Kuyper are both right and wrong at this point.

Kuyper is correct to note that apologetics arises from within the study of the Bible and Reformed dogmatics and is not something done apart from the very content of Reformed dogmatics. For which/what God do we seek to defend or vindicate? Warfield’s own understanding of apologetics leaves one in no doubt that when doing apologetics, the deity defended is not, at least explicitly, the God of the Bible. He (in good classical fashion) seeks to argue for a generic deity. Once we make space for this generic deity we can then consider specific candidates. However, Warfield is correct to note that apologetics needs to present the truth claims of the gospel without embarrassment.¹
(Continue Reading…)

While Kuyper describes the antithesis in absolute terms, as we see in (K2), he does allow for aspects of science that are not affected by the fall such as weighing, measuring and the use of logic.¹ He also allows for a neutral zone within the context of common grace where believers and unbelievers can meet with equality and determine common principles of knowledge. This may be related to his territorial view of common grace in which spatial analogies govern. Van Til will improve on Kuyper with his temporal/historical formulation of the doctrine of common grace.

Another factor in Kuyper’s apparent inconsistency here may be his discussion of a formal faith.² Kuyper wants to account for why we believe in the existence of ourselves (i.e., the existence of the “ego”) and in the trustworthiness of the delivery of the senses. He desires to explain how it is that we can know things. In other words, Kuyper is discussing the subject/object relationship and developing his epistemological theory.³
(Continue Reading…)

Kuyper

Kuyper’s central epistemological insight (K1) involves the recognition of the antithesis between belief and unbelief. While ideally there is but one science that human consciousness adds to throughout the centuries, the fact of the matter is that the introduction of sin into the world through the fall produces an “abnormal” condition.¹

There are those scientists who view the world through the lens of normality assuming that the way things are is the way they have always been. Then there are scientists who have experienced palingenesis (regeneration) that helps them realize that the world which they explore has been ruptured by sin and is in the process of being redeemed. The antithesis between belief and unbelief leads to the development of two sciences, although Kuyper recognizes that ideally there is only one science.²
(Continue Reading…)