While Warfield is on solid ground to affirm the objectivity, intelligibility, and clarity of God’s revelation to all men, he makes a wrong turn, so to speak, when he holds that the evidence for Christianity only yields probable certainty (W2).

In his article, “The Real Problem of Inspiration,” Warfield addresses the matter of biblical evidence for the trustworthiness of the teaching of Jesus and the apostles.

Of course, this evidence is not in the strict logical sense “demonstrative;” it is “probable” evidence. It therefore leaves open the metaphysical possibility of its being mistaken. But it may be contended that it is about as great in amount and weight as “probable” evidence can be made, and that the strength of conviction which it is adapted to produce may be and should be practically equal to that produced by demonstration itself. ¹

Inductive examination of the evidence in the nature of the case, for Warfield, can never yield absolute certainty even when the evidence is absolutely clear.²
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Warfield
At the outset it should be mentioned that Van Til understood that both Warfield and Kuyper held to essentially the same solid, biblically based Reformed theology and that his critical appropriation of each was done with the goal of formulating an apologetic more consistent with the solid theology each man embraced.¹

As noted previously in (W1), Warfield was so convinced of the objectivity, intelligibility, and clarity of revelation to all men in nature and history that it was not reasonable for anyone to reject the truth of Christianity.² The evidence of the truth of Christianity is available for all to assess, regardless of spiritual condition. Arguing against the notion that the validity of the faith resides in the subjective change that occurs in regeneration, Warfield notes,

It is not true that the Christian view of the world is subjective merely, and is incapable of validation in the forum of pure reason. It is not true that the arguments adduced for the support of the foundation of the Christian religion lack objective validity. It is not even true that the minds of sinful men are inaccessible to the “evidences”…³

In other words, the evidence for the validity of the Christian faith was a matter of public record. It was not, conversely, merely about personal predilection. Warfield readily grants that the presence of evidence will not in and of itself convert an unbeliever to the faith, for that is the work of the Holy Spirit. But the work of the Holy Spirit in regeneration is not done in the absence of the revelation of God in nature and history.
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Bahnsen’s Schematic

Here I want to provide in brief outline form Greg Bahnsen’s schematic of Van Til’s critical appropriation of Warfield and Kuyper. In the following series of blog posts I will then seek to flesh out the points.¹

Bahnsen explains Van Til’s approach in the following manner:

According to Van Til, we find these three things in both Warfield and Kuyper: (1) a brilliant conviction of central importance which is relevant to our theory of knowledge and apologetics, (2) another notion, which is inconsistent with the first conviction, and then (3) a view of apologetics that is mistakenly inferred from that first conviction.²

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1. Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 596-600.↩
2. Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 597.↩

Cornelius Van Til’s presuppositionalist apologetic has often been understood as a critical rejection of the classical apologetic of Old Princeton stalwart Benjamin B. Warfield in favor of the viewpoint of Dutch statesman/theologian Abraham Kuyper. However, as Greg Bahnsen has pointed out, an accurate reading of Van Til qualifies this common assumption.¹

Of course Van Til is critical of Warfield and appreciative of Kuyper, but Van Til’s assessment of both Warfield and Kuyper is much more complex than a categorical rejection of Warfield and wholesale embrace of Kuyper would suggest. In fact, Van Til attempts to build on the strengths and eschew the weaknesses of both these two Reformed giants. Van Til provides a critical appropriation of both Warfield and Kuyper as he seeks to explicate his presuppositional approach to apologetics.
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James W. Sire has recently made a contribution to the current thinking on worldview with his new book Naming the Elephant - Worldview as a Concept. Sire has grappled with the issues involved in worldview thinking for many years now. In fact, his book The Universe Next Door has gone through three editions up until 1997. With each edition he amended his own definition of worldview and refined the basic ingredients. The working definition of worldview at that time was the following:

“A worldview is a set of presuppositions (or assumptions) which we hold (consciously or subconsciously) about the basic makeup of our world.”¹

When David Naugle’s landmark study, Worldview: the History of a Concept came out in 2002, Sire sensed a need to go even further in refining his own definition. Naugle’s book provided the impetus for this latest book by Sire in which he offers four important revisions to his own definition of worldview:
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1. James W. Sire, The Universe Next Door Intervarsity Press, 1988), 17.↩

Secularization has been a topic of increasing discussion over the last few years. The political climate and the rise of fundamentalist Islam have brought discussions of public life and religion to the fore. I thought it would be an interesting point of discussion to look into developing a Biblical worldview and to examine whether such a worldview should allow for secularization.

As we seek to develop a Christian worldview, should we incorporate room for the secular? Should there be a mixture of church and state? Should all Christian musicians seek to write and perform worship music exclusively? These questions are all relevant to the believer as he/she interacts with the culture around him/her.
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Peter Leithart is posting on Postfoundationalism with reference to John Franke’s recent ETS lecture on the same topic. There is not much to disagree with in respect to Leithart’s critique of Franke. However, why is it that the default mode of Christian thinking on epistemology is foundationalist? “Moderate” foundationalist, to be sure, but foundationalist nonetheless.
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While the discussion on foundationalism has been alive and well for years now, especially in regard to postmodernism, it seems that Paul Helm’s review of Franke’s book The Character of Theology has sparked renewed discussion on that subject among Reformed bloggers. It is here that I wish to submit my two cents.

Thesis
It is the thesis of this article that one can very well reject postmodern anti-foundationalism along with its illegitimate postevangelical stepchild without committing oneself to foundationalism – whether strong (i.e., “classical”), moderate, or otherwise. In fact, it is my contention that a truly Reformed epistemology (no pun intended) must not be foundationalist at all. Therefore, I will assert that we have strong personal and (more importantly) strong biblical precedent & reason to reject both Scylla and Charybdis – both foundationalism and non-/post-/anti-foundationalism. (Continue Reading…)

Much of Cornelius Van Til’s writing addressed the problem of the one and the many. It is a philosophical problem that many of the great philosophers attempt to solve and (in my estimation) is one of the [implicit] drivers behind the deconstructionist project. Understanding the problem of the one and many is very useful for anyone seeking to develop a positive (offensive) apologetic. This post will seek to examine how one particular formulation of humanism stands up to the challenge of this problem.

Corliss Lamont was one of the most prominent humanists of the 19^th century. We will examine the humanist system of ethics and its relation to the philosophical problem of the one and many through Lamont’s brand of humanism, which he calls “Naturalistic Humanism.”
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