On Ethical Egoism (II)
As we have seen in the previous post, both Frankena and Medlin exploit what they perceive to be inconsistencies involved in the universalization of ethical egoism. Jesse Kalin has risen to the defense of the coherence of ethical egoism, but is he successful? It is to this question that we will now turn.
Analysis of Kalin’s Response
Recall that Frankena’s criticism centers on that fact that ethical egoism produces contradictory moral judgments when people’s self-interests collide. This is a result of the two parenetic principles that Frankena stipulates underlie ethical egoism:
(1)
(2)
When the interests of X and Z conflict, “X ought to do y†and “X ought not to do y†both follow when X and Z apply principles (1) and (2) in their capacity as either a first- or third-person moral agent.1 Kalin agrees that (1) is central to any egoistic position, but he takes issues with (2) and he replaces principle (2) with principle (3) instead:
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- For example, let’s say Tom could assuredly get away with stealing from Fred. When Tom applies principle (1), we end up with “Tom should steal from Fred.†When Fred (as a third-party in this situation) applies principle (2), we end up with “Tom should not steal from Fred.â€↩